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I.

ASSIGNMENT
1.

I previously submitted an opening report in this matter on June 5,

2015 (“Cornell Report”),1 which sets forth my qualifications and in which I opined
that the fair value of Dell as of the Appraisal Date was $28.61 per share.2 Also on
June 5, 2015, Professors Glenn Hubbard and Stephen Shay submitted reports on
behalf of Respondent (“Hubbard Report” and “Shay Report,” respectively).
2.

Counsel for Petitioners asked me to review and comment on Professor

Hubbard’s opinions as set forth in his report.3
II.

SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
3.

Based on my analysis of the record evidence and the results of the

economic analyses described below, as well as my background and expertise, I
have reached the following conclusions:
 Professor Hubbard makes downward adjustments to his selected
projections that are unsupported by the facts in the record and
inconsistent with assumptions made by Dell’s management and Silver
Lake in developing contemporaneous projections used in the normal
course of business. These adjustments understate Professor
Hubbard’s concluded value using his BCG Case free cash flow

1

2
3

Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the same meaning as in the
Cornell Report.
Cornell Report, ¶ 18.
I also respond to certain opinions expressed in Professor Shay’s report that
relate to positions Professor Hubbard adopts in his expert report regarding the
valuation implications of Dell’s tax rate and alleged tax obligations.
1

projections (the “Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case”) by $5.04 per share.4
 The projections Professor Hubbard selected for his discounted cash
flow (“DCF”) analyses also improperly understated the expected
impact of Dell’s cost savings initiatives. These adjustments
understate Professor Hubbard’s concluded value using the Hubbard
Adjusted BCG Case projections by $3.52 per share.5
 Professor Hubbard makes adjustments to Dell’s cash balance and
deducts tax liabilities that are inappropriate and inconsistent with
contemporaneous DCF valuations as of the Appraisal Date. These
adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s concluded value using
the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections by $5.59 per share.6
 Professor Hubbard makes certain assumptions that inflate his estimate
of Dell’s WACC. These adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s
concluded value using the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections
by $0.57 per share.7
 Professor Hubbard’s arguments why a Sum-of-the-Parts (“SOTP”)
trading multiples analysis is inapplicable to Dell are not credible given
Dell management’s and analysts’ use of this valuation method. Nor
do his criticisms cause me to question the appropriateness of my use
of SOTP DCF and trading multiples analyses as reasonableness
4

5

6

7

Professor Hubbard examined the sensitivity of his concluded value based on a
DCF valuation using the Bank Case projections, after applying similar
downward adjustments (“Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case”). These adjustments
understate Professor Hubbard’s DCF value using the Hubbard Adjusted Bank
Case projections by $5.04 per share.
These adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s DCF value using the
Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections by $4.20 per share.
These adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s DCF value using the
Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections by $5.60 per share.
These adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s DCF value using the
Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections by $0.75 per share. Revised Exhibit
1 shows that the sum of the individual adjustments is less (more) than the total
difference between Professor Hubbard and my DCF valuations for the Hubbard
Adjusted BCG projections (Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case) projections. The
reason is that certain of the adjustments affecting the free cash flow projections
have a cumulating impact when aggregated.
2

checks on the results of my consolidated DCF valuation.
4.

I provide the support for my opinions in the sections that follow.

Finally, I further support the reasonableness of my fair value conclusion based on
the DCF valuation of Dell as of October 29, 2013 prepared by E&Y for financial
accounting purposes that Professor Hubbard uses as support for certain of his
valuation assumptions. After considering the Hubbard Report, I continue to
conclude that the fair value of Dell as of October 29, 2013 was $28.61 per share.8
III.

PROFESSOR HUBBARD’S ADJUSTMENTS TO HIS SELECTED
PROJECTIONS ARE SUBJECTIVE AND UNFOUNDED
5.

In performing his DCF analyses, Professor Hubbard described the

Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case as “the most accurate and reliable overall view of the
Company’s potential future cash flows through FY2017 as a public company.”9
Professor Hubbard also performed a DCF valuation of Dell using the Bank Case
projections. In support of using these projections, Professor Hubbard noted that
the “Bank Case … is useful to consider for corroboration” of his analysis because
“it was closest in time to the valuation date, had management involvement, and
included information shown to potential lenders and rating agencies.”10

8

9
10

Appendix A contains a list of the documents that I relied upon in forming my
opinions set forth in this report
Hubbard Report, ¶ 187.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 187.
3

6.

According to Professor Hubbard, he needed to make “certain

adjustments” to the BCG Case and Bank Case projections “to reflect the change in
market conditions between the time they were prepared in late 2012/early 2013 and
the Merger date of October 29, 2013.”11 More specifically, Professor Hubbard
revised BCG’s original revenue projections to take into account subsequent (and
more pessimistic) International Data Corp. (“IDC”) PC sales forecasts and Dell’s
earlier revenue attachment rates for Support & Deployment (“S&D”) services even
though neither Dell’s management nor BCG had updated its projections as of the
Appraisal Date. Further, while Professor Hubbard characterizes his forecast as the
“Adjusted BCG 25% Case,” the annual cost savings used by Professor Hubbard are
not the same cost savings associated with the BCG 25% Case as discussed in the
May Proxy.12 The May Proxy described cost saving scenarios of 25% and 75% of
Dell management’s $3.3 billion in annual cost savings. In addition, Professor
Hubbard extended his forecast period for both sets of projections by an additional
five years for the sole purpose of justifying his valuation amounts given his
perpetuity growth rate and his WACC estimate. Finally, Professor Hubbard used
Dell’s combined marginal tax rate of 35.8% during the terminal period in both sets

11
12

Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 190, 279.
May Proxy, pp. 100-101.
4

of projections, assuming that Dell would necessarily repatriate its offshore cash at
that point and thus incur significantly higher tax liabilities.
7.

As I describe in greater detail below, not only are these adjustments

subjective and unfounded, they result in the creation of an entirely new set of
projections based solely upon Professor Hubbard’s ex post opinions. Further,
every one of these adjustments reduces Professor Hubbard’s estimate of Dell’s per
share equity value. Taken together, Professor Hubbard’s adjustments result in an
understatement of Dell’s implied equity value of $5.04 per share for both the
Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case. (See Revised
Exhibit 1.)
A.

Updated PC Industry Forecasts

8.

Professor Hubbard adjusts both the BCG Base Case and Bank Case

projections to use IDC’s PC industry forecasts published in August 2013. This
change alone lowers his DCF valuations using the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case by
$1.35 per share and the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case by $0.21 per share.
9.

According to Professor Hubbard, the Base Case projections that BCG

used to create its January and February 2013 presentations to Dell’s Special
Committee were based on August 2012 market data from IDC.13 Professor

13

Hubbard Report, ¶ 192.
5

Hubbard further asserts that between December 2012 (when the BCG projections
were initially prepared) and the Appraisal Date, the market outlook for desktop and
notebook PCs had deteriorated,14 a view that was not shared by either Silver
Lake or Dell management as of August 2013 (when the Bank Case was
created).15 To reflect this more pessimistic outlook, Professor Hubbard updated
the August 2012 IDC forecast that BCG used in its Base Case model with the
August 2013 IDC forecast.16 Interestingly, while Professor Hubbard quotes Mr.
Gladden’s testimony about IDC (and Gartner) being slow in reacting to shifts and
updating their forecasts, he omits Mr. Gladden’s testimony that Dell management
“had a conclusion that even their short-term reporting wasn’t very accurate, let
alone their forecasts.”17
10.

The BCG forecasts that Professor Hubbard relied on used IDC

forecast data. According to the testimony of Mr. Ning, BCG’s representative,
BCG had already updated their projections in January 2013 to take into account
IDC’s updated forecast for PC shipments.18 Dell’s Special Committee did not ask
14
15

16
17

18

Hubbard Report, ¶ 192.
Dell Exhibit 25 (Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), pp. 20-21
(DELLE00779571-72).
Hubbard Report, ¶ 192.
Gladden Deposition, p. 79. Mr. Gladden further testified that the relative
inaccuracy of the industry forecasts was one reason the Company considered
investing in developing “a proprietary model that we would own that would
give us more capability and [sic] forecasting demand.” (Id.)
Ning Deposition, pp. 195-196.
6

BCG to update its projections between J.P. Morgan’s and Evercore’s issuance of
initial fairness opinions in February 2013 and their issuance of final fairness
opinions in August 2013.19 Moreover, Dell management did not update the BCG
projections to take into account the most recent PC industry forecasts as of the
Appraisal Date. Instead, they and Silver Lake prepared the Bank Case projections
around the time of the August 2013 IDC forecast that Professor Hubbard used.20
11.

Further, Professor Hubbard’s downward adjustment of BCG’s Base

Case to use IDC data that purportedly reflects “deterioration” in the PC industry
appears to be inconsistent with Dell management’s and Silver Lake’s rejection of
that more pessimistic view in the Bank Case. The Bank Case projections could
have reflected the IDC forecasts Professor Hubbard used had Dell management
and Silver Lake thought it was reasonable to do so. Instead, Dell and Silver Lake

19

20

See, e.g., Mandl Deposition, p. 151 (Mr. Mandl does not recall if the Special
Committee asked BCG to update its projections before it rendered its final
presentation for the fairness opinions). See also Ning Deposition, pp. 172-73
(BCG did not receive any more updates from Dell management on the
productivity plan.)
Silver Lake updated these projections in late August for its Rating Agency
Presentation, and the forecasts were further refined in early October for
purposes of E&Y’s 2013 ASC 805 analysis. See Email from Kyle Paster to
James Alejandro et al., September 4, 2013 (DELLE00733339);
DELLE00733340.xlsx; Email from Jason Nies to Amber M. Price et al.,
October 10, 2013 (DELLE00734151); DELLE00734152.xlsx.
7

updated the Bank Case projections to reflect the stabilization and projected positive
unit sales growth as shown in recent forecasts by both Gartner and IDC.21
12.

Professor Hubbard disregards this critical basis underlying the Bank

Case projections and instead expresses concern that “they may have an upward,
optimistic bias.”22 Although it is true that the forecast revenues in the Bank Case
are higher overall than those shown in the BCG Base Case,23 the evidence I have
described above suggests that the Bank Case projections reflect management’s best
estimate of Dell’s future performance around the time of the Buyout Transaction.
Consequently, any downward adjustment of revenue forecasts that were lower to
begin with than the contemporaneous revenue forecasts in the Bank Case
projections to reflect an even more negative view that was not shared by either the
acquirers or Dell management is unreasonable and not supported by the evidence.
13.

Delaware Chancery Court opinions have expressed skepticism

regarding post-transaction adjustments to management forecasts after consultation
with the subject company’s management in conjunction with litigation, noting that
such adjustments may reflect hindsight bias and the opinions of parties directly
involved in the subject litigation who either have an interest in its outcome (i.e.,
21

22
23

See, e.g., Silver Lake Partners, Project Denali, September 2013 (Durban Exhibit
19), pp. 40-43.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 178.
Compare Cornell Report Exhibit 1A to Exhibit 2.
8

Dell management and Silver Lake) or who have been hired as litigation consultants
to help those parties achieve a favorable outcome.24 For purposes of my analysis
in this case, I used BCG’s Base Case revenue projections as created by BCG and
approved by Dell’s Special Committee, took into account those cost savings that
were actually in place and included in Dell’s business plan, and adjusted these
projections consistent with Mr. Ning’s testimony regarding the appropriate level of
projected cost savings given Dell’s actual progress in realizing those savings (and
remaining within the range of probabilities presented to Dell’s Special committee
by BCG).25 In addition, I used the Bank Case projections that were created shortly
before the Appraisal Date by Silver Lake with input from Dell’s management and
were presented to potential lenders to support financing during August and
September 2013. Dell’s and Silver Lake’s use of these projections to support

24

25

Owen v. Cannon, pp. 52-53 citing Agranoff v. Miller. As former Vice
Chancellor Strine noted in Agranoff v. Miller, “Suppose there was an interview
with Sir George Martin from 1962 in which he opined as to how many number
one songs he thought would be released by his new protégés, the Beatles.
Could one fast-forward to 1971, interview Martin, and revise Martin’s earlier
projection in some reliable way, recognizing that Martin would have known the
correct answer as of that date? How could Martin provide information that
would not be possibly influenced in some way by his knowledge of the actual
success enjoyed by the Beatles and his recollection of his earlier projection?”
(Agranoff v. Miller, p. 27.)
BCG00013575.xls and JPM_0119609.xls; Ning Deposition, p. 269 (“If they
had already achieved the 50% [cost savings], then it was reasonable to rely on
50%”); Ning Exhibit 12 (Project Denali, Compendium of presented materials,
February 5, 2013), p. 64 (DELL00002275).
9

financing indicates to me that they represented the acquirers’ (and Dell
management’s) best estimate of the Company’s expected future performance as of
the Appraisal Date.26 In short, the projections I used in my analyses represent
either the best view of the Special Committee or of Dell management and Silver
Lake regarding Dell’s expected future performance as of the Appraisal Date.
14.

In contrast, Professor Hubbard took the BCG Base Case and made

after-the-fact downward adjustments that do not reflect either Dell management’s
or the Special Committee’s views prior to the close of the Buyout Transaction.
Moreover, the adjustments that Professor Hubbard made to purportedly reflect the
updated IDC forecasts do not even match those forecasts in the interim years
between 2012 and 2016. Instead, Professor Hubbard altered the PC sales forecasts
in the BCG Base Case to reflect the August 2013 IDC forecasts for the years 2012
and 2016 and independently interpolated the projected annual sales between these
two endpoints.27 Thus, he reinterpreted the August 2013 IDC forecasts to create
26

27

DELLE00734152.xls; Dell Rating Agency Presentation, April 2014 (Ning
Exhibit 26) (DELLE00216698-216732). As then-Vice Chancellor Strine
observed in Delaware Open MRI Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Kessler,
because it is a federal felony to knowingly obtain any funds from a financial
institution by false or fraudulent pretenses or representations, projections that
are provided to a financing source are typically given “great weight” by this
Court. Delaware Open MRI Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. Kessler, 2006 WL
4764042, at *29 (Del. Ch. April 26, 2006).)
See Hubbard Figures.xlsx, “IDC & Gartner” tab, Cells M2:T21 and Hubbard
BCG Case DCF Model, “Denali base case” tab, Cells AU122:BE129,
AU141:BE148.
10

his own forecast and uses this self-created ex-post forecast to justify his lower
estimate of Dell’s value. Professor Hubbard’s substitution of his own forecasts for
those that were accepted contemporaneously by parties to the transaction provides
further evidence that he has created an entirely new set of projections after the fact
based on key inputs that were not reviewed and approved by these parties.
15.

Professor Hubbard made similar downward “market” adjustments to

the PC forecasts used in the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections even though
the original Bank Case projections reflected Silver Lake’s and Dell management’s
views shortly before the Transaction Date.28 He does not state which forecast he
used in making these adjustments, but merely applied “modest adjustments as
needed to reflect market conditions as of the Merger date that differed from those
reflected in the spreadsheet” on the order of “less than one percent for desktops
and less than three percent for notebooks as of FY2018.”29 Once again, Professor
Hubbard made independent unsupported adjustments to contemporaneous
projections that were created by the acquirers with input from Dell management,
substituting his judgment for those parties and effectively creating his own set of
projections. And again, the end result is that Professor Hubbard has created an
entirely new set of projections based on key inputs that were not approved by
28

29

Hubbard Bank Case DCF Model.xlsx, “Financials Control” tab, Cells F59:I59,
F76:I76.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 279.
11

Silver Lake or Dell management at the time of the transaction. Consequently, both
the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections
are speculative and unreliable.
B.

Adjusted Attachment Rates

16.

Professor Hubbard also adjusted the attachment rates30 that were used

to estimate the ratio of Support & Deployment (S&D) revenue as a function of the
underlying hardware revenue in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections.31
This change alone lowers his DCF valuation using the Hubbard Adjusted BCG
Case by $0.96 per share.
17.

According to Professor Hubbard, the original BCG model used a fixed

percentage to estimate S&D revenue for New Dell (Enterprise Services Group,
Software, and Services).32 Professor Hubbard felt this approach was “no longer
appropriate” due to the changes he made to update PC industry forecasts for Core
Dell (End User Computing (i.e., the PC business) with attached software and
services).33 Professor Hubbard, therefore, used the percentage of New Dell sales to
30

31

32
33

An attachment rate is a methodology used to forecast sales of complementary
products in relation to sales of a primary product that involves determining the
amount of complementary products that will be sold along with a given unit of
primary product within a specified time period.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 195. Professor Hubbard did not update the attachment rates
used in the Bank Case projections since those projections were prepared closer
in time to the valuation date (¶ 279).
Hubbard Report, ¶ 195.
Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 195-196.
12

estimated attached S&D revenue (17%) that had been used in the September 21
Case developed by Dell management in the fall of 2012.34 However, Mr. Ning
testified that Dell management provided the attachment rates BCG used in its
January and February 2013 analyses based on Dell’s historical experience and that
BCG did not make any independent determinations regarding these rates.35 The
attachment rates imputed by BCG’s initial analysis range between 20.7 and
21.1%.36
18.

Professor Hubbard does not explain why reverting back to Dell’s

older, lower attachment rate projections is reasonable, especially given that Dell
management provided BCG with updated attachment rate data after retaining BCG
in November 2012.37 Nor does Professor Hubbard explain why he did not use the
attachment rates directly forecasted in the Bank Case projections, which take
account of the most recent forecast attachment rates.38 Consequently, Professor
Hubbard’s adjustments to the attachment rates used in the BCG Base Case (i.e.,
34
35
36

37
38

Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 195-196.
Ning Deposition, pp. 43-44.
See Ning Exhibit 18 (BCG00013575.xlsx), Tab “New Denali model_BCG (2),”
Cells E13:I13, E16:I16.
Ning Deposition, pp. 22-23, 43-44.
The Bank Case projections show a somewhat higher attachment rate percentage
(17.9%) than the September 21 Case (17.0%). See DELLE00734152.xlsx, Tab
“S&P” and DELLE0093835.xlsm), at row 176 of “Details” Tab. If Professor
Hubbard had used the Bank Case attachment rate percentage in his BCG Case
analysis, his estimate of Dell’s per share value would have been $0.22 per share
higher.
13

substituting an older, lower attachment rate forecast for a more recent, higher one)
are unsupported by the evidence in this case and are therefore unreasonable.
C.

Five Year Extension of the Projections to Support Additional
Required Investment and Assumed 2% Growth in Perpetuity

19.

Professor Hubbard’s adjusted projections added an additional five-

year transition period to the explicit forecast periods of the BCG Case and the
Bank Case projections because he concluded that “Dell’s business would not be
expected to achieve a steady state by the end of the initial BCG projection period
in FY2017” due to industry changes and the fact that Dell was undergoing a
transformation.39 Professor Hubbard notes that an extension period “allows key
metrics such as growth rates, profit margins, and reinvestment rates to stabilize.”40
20.

Although I agree with the concept that an extension period may be

reasonable in some situations, Professor Hubbard’s “extension” is inappropriate in
this case given that, as he pointed out, Dell is a mature company with moderate
growth prospects.41 In Dell’s case, normalized growth rates and margins can
reasonably be modeled without extending the forecast period. Further, Professor
Hubbard does not use his “extension period” to trend towards normalized growth
rates or margins.42 Instead, Professor Hubbard’s extension enables him to add
39
40
41
42

Hubbard Report, ¶ 200.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 200.
Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 58, 62.
Professor Hubbard instead assumed that the FY 2017 operating margin from the
14

sufficient additional investment that reduces Dell’s projected free cash flows in the
explicit forecast period by an amount sufficient enough to offset the impact of his
use of a 2% perpetuity growth rate in his terminal value calculation. In particular,
Revised Exhibit 1 shows that the additional reinvestment that Professor Hubbard
adds to the extension period (FY 2018-2022) and the Terminal Period in the
Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case model reduces his DCF valuation by $0.44 per share
and $1.75 per share, respectively. This additional investment more than offsets the
valuation impact of his use of a higher perpetuity growth rate (2%) than I used in
my (1%) terminal value calculation.43 As a result, Professor Hubbard’s “extension
period” appears to be designed to lower the ultimate valuation of Dell while
acknowledging that it is appropriate to assume a positive terminal growth rate.

43

Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case reflected a normalized margin and trended annual
revenue growth rates between FY 2018 and 2022 such that his extended
projections achieved his assumed 2% growth rate in perpetuity by the last year
of his forecast period (FY 2022). (Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 201-202, Exhibit 18.)
Revised Exhibit 1 shows that the impact of lowering Professor Hubbard’s
Perpetuity Growth Rate (“PGR”) from 2% to 1% decreases his DCF value by
$1.32 per share in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case model. Thus, the net
impact of Professor Hubbard’s decision to extend the Hubbard Adjusted BCG
Case projections beyond the explicit forecast period lowers his DCF valuation
by $0.87 per share ($0.44 + $1.75 - $1.32).
15

Implied Terminal Growth Rate Assuming No Extension
21.

Exhibit 2A shows that Professor Hubbard’s calculated enterprise

value of $26.049 billion in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case DCF model44 implies
a free cash flow perpetuity growth rate (“PGR”) of -0.13% using his terminal value
based on his free cash flow projection at the end of the BCG forecast period (FY
2017). Exhibit 2B shows that Professor Hubbard’s calculated enterprise value of
$28.973 billion in the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case DCF model45 implies a free
cash flow PGR of 1.08% (i.e., almost identical to my selected PGR of 1.0%) had
he calculated his terminal value based on his free cash flow projection at the end of
the Bank Case forecast period (FY 2018). Thus, these exhibits show that
Professor Hubbard could have arrived at his estimates of Dell’s fair value while
using a PGR of 1% or lower without extending his adjusted projections beyond the
explicit forecast period.
22.

Exhibits 2A and 2B further show that the Hubbard Adjusted BCG

Case and Bank Case projections contained sufficient investment during the explicit
forecast period to support the implied PGR resulting from Professor Hubbard’s
valuation. Thus there was no need for Professor Hubbard to extend his projections.
As I demonstrate below, the BCG 50% Case and Bank Case with Cost Savings
44
45

Hubbard Report, Exhibit 18.
Hubbard Report, Exhibit 24.
16

projections I used in my DCF valuation also contain sufficient reinvestment in
order to support a 1.0% PGR at the end of the explicit forecast period.
Dell’s Projections Do Not Require Additional Reinvestment
23.

In his DCF analyses using both the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and

Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections, Professor Hubbard assumed a terminal
growth rate of 2% instead of determining what stable growth rate was consistent
with the growth rates reflected in the projections as I did.46 He concluded that
funding this future growth would require additional annual investment during the
terminal period using his “plowback” formula. In particular, Professor Hubbard
calculates required investment in a given year as the amount equal to the product
of Dell’s projected annual operating profit47 during that period and his projected
investment rate for Dell, which was Dell’s projected terminal growth rate (2%)
divided by Dell’s expected return on invested capital (“ROIC”).48 He set Dell’s
expected ROIC equal to his estimate of the Company’s WACC of 9.46%,49 which

46
47

48
49

Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 217, 282; Cornell Report, ¶¶ 99-100.
Professor Hubbard calculated Dell’s after-tax operating profit as “EBITAO
[Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Amortization, and Option (stock-based
compensation) Expense] less taxes on EBITAO minus the after-tax cost of
stock-based compensation.” (Hubbard Report, ¶ 211.)
Hubbard Report, ¶ 211.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 212.
17

implies that his required investment amounts would not generate any
additional value for Dell. There is no justification for doing this.
24.

Professor Hubbard then reduced his estimate of required annual

investment by the amount of terminal period annual investment that was already
incorporated into his model as projected capital expenditures, changes in net
working capital, and acquisitions based on BCG’s assumptions.50 Finally, he
assumed that Dell increased its investment amounts ratably each year over the
transition period to reach the required investment calculation for FY 2023 (i.e., the
terminal period) by the end of the transition period.51
25.

Professor Hubbard’s assumption that Dell’s expected ROIC equals its

WACC underestimates the expected return on the Company’s investments because
it assumes that they will not create any additional value beyond Dell’s cost of
capital. This runs directly counter to Dell’s expectations for its acquisitions, which
were given a target internal rate of return (IRR) of 15% and thus assumes that these
acquisitions would create additional value for Dell because this target hurdle rate
was higher than Professor Hubbard’s estimate of Dell’s WACC.52 Because he
underestimated Dell’s expected return on investment, he overestimated the

50
51
52

Hubbard Report, ¶ 213.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 213.
See Dell Ex. 28 (Bank Presentation), p. 8.
18

amounts that Dell would need to invest during the terminal period to achieve its
terminal growth rate and therefore underestimated Dell’s cash flows during the
terminal period.
26.

Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that Dell’s expected

return on investment is equal to its WACC, I have determined that, given my
WACC estimate of 9% and estimated perpetuity growth rate of 1%,53 no additional
adjustments to projected investment amounts through acquisitions, capital
expenditures, or changes in net working capital are necessary for either my Bank
Case with Cost Savings or my BCG 50% Case scenario as shown in the Cornell
Report because this scenario already includes sufficient investment amounts when
I test it by applying Professor Hubbard’s formula.54
27.

When I apply Professor Hubbard’s reinvestment formula to my Bank

Case with Cost Savings projections, I determined that the annual reinvestment
amount required during the terminal period to sustain a terminal growth rate of 1%
(my estimate) at an expected ROIC of 9.0% (my estimate of Dell’s WACC) is
approximately $451 million (see Exhibit 3A). However, the Bank Case with Cost
53
54

Cornell Report, ¶¶ 120.
Because Professor Hubbard has estimated Dell’s perpetuity growth rate to be
2% and its WACC to be 9.46%, (Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 217, 257), applying his
formula to my projection scenarios and using his estimated WACC and
perpetuity growth rate leads to significantly higher required annual
reinvestment amounts.
19

Savings projections already assume that Dell would make $400 million per year in
new acquisitions during the terminal period,55 and that Dell’s net working capital
needs are $15 million per year in the terminal period. Thus, Dell’s required annual
additional investment during the terminal period would be $36 million before
taking prior acquisitions and changes in net working capital into account.
However, according to Dell’s FY 2013 10-K, the Company made $4.844 billion in
acquisitions during that year and the Bank Case projected that Dell would make
$400 million in acquisitions each year between FY 2014 and FY 2018, for a total
of $6.844 billion in acquisitions.56 In addition, the Bank Case projections assumed
that net working capital would increase by $527 million between FY 2013 and FY
2018.57 The total required investment amount between FY 2013 and FY 2018 was
$2.213 billion before taking projected acquisitions and increases in net working
capital into account. The implied lump sum additional investment necessary to
sustain a 1% PGR at a 9.0% WACC as of the end of FY 2017 is $451 million,58 but

55

56
57
58

Cornell Report, Exhibit 11. The Bank Case projections are already
conservative with respect to reinvestment assumptions because they exclude
expected incremental benefits to revenue and EBITDA from these projected
acquisitions. Dell Exhibit 25 (August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation), p. 54.
Dell FY 2013 10-K, p. 65; Cornell Report, Exhibit 11.
Cornell Report, Exhibit 11.
I assume that the annual reinvestment amount grows by 1% each year during
the terminal period consistent with my assumed growth in free cash flows.
Using the Gordon Growth Model, the lump sum amount equals the annual
required investment of $36 million divided by (9% WACC – 1% PGR).
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the surplus investment amount (Acquisitions + Changes in Net Working Capital –
Required Investment Amount) at that time was projected to be $5.158 billion,
which is more than enough built-up investment to fulfill any additional investments
required to sustain my projected perpetuity growth rate of 1%.
28.

When I apply the reinvestment formula to the BCG 50% Case

projections, I determined that Dell’s required annual investment amount during the
terminal period would be approximately $415 million.59 (See Exhibit 3B.)
However, the BCG projections show Dell making $4.95 billion in additional
acquisitions in FY 2013.60 In addition, net working capital was projected to
increase by a net amount of $2.948 billion between FY 2013 and FY 2017.61 The
total required investment amount between FY 2013 and FY 2017 for a 1% PGR is
$1.844 billion before taking projected acquisitions and increases in net working
capital into account. The implied lump sum additional investment necessary to
sustain a 1% PGR at a 9.0% WACC as of the end of FY 2017 is $5.188 billion,62
but the surplus investment amount at that time was projected to be $6.055 billion,

59
60
61
62

Cornell Report, Exhibit 8.
Cornell Report, Exhibit 8.
Cornell Report, Exhibit 8.
I assume that the annual reinvestment amount grows by 1% each year during
the terminal period consistent with my assumed growth in free cash flows.
Using the Gordon Growth Model, the lump sum amount equals the annual
required investment of $415 million divided by (9% WACC – 1% PGR).
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which is more than enough built-up investment to fulfill any additional investments
required to sustain my projected perpetuity growth rate of 1%.
29.

Further, I have reviewed twelve DCF analyses that value Dell

between May 24, 2012 and January 31, 2014 (see Exhibit 4). None of these
analyses include additional reinvestment amounts to sustain the growth implied by
their terminal value calculation of Dell.
30.

Finally, as noted above, Delaware Chancery Court opinions have

expressed skepticism regarding post-transaction adjustments to management
forecasts made in the course of litigation since these adjustments may reflect
hindsight bias and the opinions of parties who have an interest in the outcome of
the litigation.63 By adding incremental investment amounts that were neither
considered nor accepted by Dell management, Silver Lake, the Special Committee
(or its financial advisors), or the financing banks, Professor Hubbard effectively
substitutes his own judgment almost two years after the transaction close for the
contemporaneous expectations of these insiders.
D.

Cost Savings from May Proxy

31.

The May Proxy disclosed BCG projections that reflected the impact of

cost savings projections based on Dell’s ability to achieve 25% and 75% of Dell

63

Owen v. Cannon, pp. 52-53 (citing Agranoff v. Miller).
22

management’s goal of $3.3 billion in annual cost savings (“BCG 25% Case” and
“BCG 75% Case” projections).64 These cost savings are reflected in the BCG 25%
Case and BCG 75% Case DCF valuations used by the Special Committee’s
advisors in their fairness opinion valuations.65 However, these are not the cost
savings projections used by Professor Hubbard. Instead, Professor Hubbard relied
on cost savings projections contained in a tab within BCG’s valuation Excel
model.66
32.

While Professor Hubbard characterizes his forecast as the “Adjusted

BCG 25% Case,” the annual cost savings used by Professor Hubbard assume the
cost savings phase in more quickly but plateau at a level lower than the cost
savings associated with the BCG 25% Case as disclosed in the May Proxy, as set
forth below (in millions).67
Comparison of BCG “25%” Cost Savings

Hubbard “25%”
BCG 25% in Proxy

2014

2015

2016

2017

$200
$84

$730
$419

$780
$838

$810
$838

Using the cost savings for the explicit forecast period shown in the May proxy
would reduce Professor Hubbard’s estimate of Dell’s value by $0.12 (see Revised
64
65
66

67

May Proxy, pp. 100-101.
May Proxy, pp. 67-68, 72, 78-79.
Ning Exhibit 18 (BCG00013575.xlsx), Tab (“01-NCBM Minus”) at cells
L45:O45.
May Proxy, pp. 100-101.
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Revised Exhibit 1). Furthermore, Professor Hubbard’s extension of the
projections (discussed in ¶¶ 19-20 above) inexplicably results in a decline in the
cost savings of approximately $115 million by 2022. In contrast, my BCG 50%
Case assumes that Dell’s cost savings grow at Dell’s perpetuity growth rate (1% in
my analysis) after the explicit forecast period.68
33.

Eliminating Professor Hubbard’s extension period and growing

BCG’s cost savings by 1% during the terminal period would increase Professor
Hubbard’s estimate by an additional $0.47 (see Revised Exhibit 1). In Section
IV, I discuss the impact of Professor Hubbard’s failure to take into account the full
extent of Dell’s expected cost savings as reflected in the BCG 50% Case and Bank
Case with Cost Savings projections.
E. Professor Hubbard Erroneously Used Dell’s Marginal Tax Rate During
the Terminal Period of His DCF Analyses, Incorrectly Assuming That
Dell’s Offshore Cash Will Be Repatriated At That Rate
34.

In his DCF analysis, Professor Hubbard used two different tax rates.

During his projection period, he used a tax rate of 18.5% as identified by Professor
Shay, Dell’s tax expert.69 For his terminal period, he used Dell’s combined
marginal tax rate (federal and state) of 35.8% under the assumption that “strategies
that reduce current taxes are generally deferral strategies, not avoidance strategies,
68
69

Cornell Report, Exhibit 10.
Hubbard Report,¶ 221.
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and are generally not sustainable in perpetuity,” again relying on Professor Shay’s
opinions.70 In contrast, I used a tax rate of 21% in both the forecast period and
terminal period based on Dell management’s September 21 Projections.71
35.

The impact of using Dell’s marginal tax rate of 35.8% instead of

18.5% in the terminal period is to reduce Dell’s implied equity value per share by
$2.40 per share in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and by $2.82 in the Hubbard
Adjusted Bank Case. In contrast, the impact of using a cash tax rate of 18.5% in
each year as opposed to the 21.0% tax rate projected by Dell management
increases Dell’s implied equity value per share by $0.58 per share in the Hubbard
Adjusted BCG Case and by $0.67 in the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case. (See
Revised Exhibit 1.)

70

71

Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 222-223. Professor Shay concluded that “deferral-based
strategies are not sustainable in perpetuity” and that “even if a firm currently
plays a lower than marginal rate, eventually marginal rates will have to be paid
on earnings.” (Shay Report, ¶ 44) He agreed with Professor Hubbard’s use of
Dell’s combined marginal tax rate in the terminal period, stating that “it would
be inappropriate to speculate about changes to future tax policy in the DCF
valuation” and that using Dell’s then-current marginal tax rates was “consistent
with behavior of investors and other business persons I have observed over
many years.” (Shay Report, ¶ 45)
Cornell Report, Exhibits 10 & 11. This is the same tax rate that the Special
Committee’s advisors used in their DCF valuations. See JPM_0003324.xlsm;
JPM_0119609.xlsm; EVERCORE00004835.xlsm; and
EVERCORE00051053.xlsm.
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36.

Professor Hubbard’s assumption that a lower than marginal tax rate is

“not sustainable in perpetuity” is inconsistent with Dell’s actual experience in
effectively paying far lower tax rates over the last 25 years. (See Exhibit 5.) In
the 25 years leading up to the Buyout Transaction, Dell’s effective tax rate was
always significantly below the marginal rate. Moreover, the effective tax rate was
lower in more recent years, averaging 23.8% over the prior 10 years and 18.5%
over the prior 3 years. This is in spite of the fact that the marginal corporate tax
rate has been at least 34% over that same time period.72
37.

Professor Hubbard’s assumption that Dell’s offshore cash will

eventually need to be repatriated in a way that necessarily results in higher
effective tax rates is not supported by the record. Exhibit 6 shows that Dell paid
significant amounts to repurchase stock (more than $36 billion) between FY 2000
and FY 2013, made over $13.5 billion in acquisitions since FY 2000, and even
began to pay dividends in FY 2013. Further, as Professor Steines points out in his
report, Dell repatriated almost $13 billion in cash between 2006 and 2013 without
incurring a significant tax liability.73 Thus, I find no evidence to suggest that Dell

72

73

The top corporate tax rate was 34% in 1988-1992 and 35% since 1993.
(http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=65)
Expert Report of John P. Steines Jr., July 24, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the
“Steines Report”), ¶ 7.
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would pay tax at the statutory rate even if the Company repatriates its “offshore”
cash.
38.

Even if Dell needed to access offshore cash in order to pay out

dividends or repurchase stock, there is no evidence it would need to repatriate that
cash in order to do so. As a tax policy paper published by the Center for American
Progress points out, “offshore” cash is not necessarily kept overseas physically. It
can be deposited in U.S. banks and even invested in U.S. projects so long as these
projects are controlled by a non-U.S. subsidiary.74 “Repatriating” cash simply
means bringing it under the control of a U.S. subsidiary rather than physically
moving cash from overseas to the U.S. For instance, as of May 2013, Apple had
$102 billion in “permanently invested” overseas income that was not subject to
U.S. taxation even though these funds were actually deposited in New York banks.
These funds could be invested in U.S. projects or investments so long as they were
not used to directly invest in Apple’s U.S. operations, pay dividends or repurchase
shares.75 Apple has been able to access these funds by borrowing at very low
interest rates and the debt issuances have carried maturities up to 30 years.76
74

75
76

Center for American Progress, “Offshore Corporate Profits: The Only Thing
Trapped is Tax Revenue,” Available online at <
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/taxreform/report/2014/01/09/81681/offshore-corporate-profits-the-only-thingtrapped-is-tax-revenue/>, p. 4.
Offshore Corporate Profits, p. 4.
“Apple Shops Third Big Bond Offering - $5B – Since 2013 Amid Shareholder
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Microsoft, Walmart, Du Pont, Coca-Cola, and Johnson & Johnson have all
employed similar strategies in recent years to avoid having to repatriate cash.77
39.

Further, a study by Graham et al. (2012) provides additional support

for the notion that repatriation of “offshore” cash is not a foregone conclusion.
The authors point out that “if [foreign earnings] are never repatriated, then no U.S.
taxes are ever paid.”78 If a company does not expect to repatriate earnings in the
foreseeable future, it can defer the additional income tax expense in perpetuity.
This deferral reduces the company’s effective tax rate because if the firm never
repatriates, it never pays the U.S. taxes.79 When a company chooses not to
repatriate earnings in the foreseeable future, these earnings are known as
permanently reinvested earnings (PRE). PRE can be very large for some
multinational companies. Graham et al. found that the aggregate PRE of the 50
largest U.S. companies in 2008 totaled $610 billion. Moreover, PRE has grown
rapidly in recent years. In 2008, 273 of the Fortune 500 companies reported some
amount of PRE for a total of $1.03 trillion. This represented a significant increase

77

78

79

Plans,” Forbes, February 2, 2015.
Offshore Corporate Profits, pp. 5-6. Professor Steines describes additional
strategies for tax-free repatriations in his report, including tax-free
reorganizations involving affiliated companies and inversions. Steines Report,
¶¶ 21-25.
Graham, John R., Jana S. Raedy, and Douglas A. Shackelford, “Research in
Accounting for Income Taxes,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Volume
43, 2012, p. 418.
Graham et al., p. 418.
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from the estimated aggregate PRE of $381 million in 2002 for 296 firms in the
S&P 500. Wunder (2009) found an average PRE of $3.74 billion per firm, which
was more than seven times the $485 million mean reported by Krull (2004) in her
study of Compustat firms in the 1990s.80
40.

This growth in permanently reinvested earnings is particularly

noteworthy because an IRS study of the tax holiday provided by the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 estimates that the holiday led to the repatriation of $362
billion of foreign earnings.81 A 2009 article in The New York Times shows that
Dell repatriated $4 billion during the tax holiday and used $2 billion to repurchase
shares.82 On the other hand, because classifying earnings as PRE was one of the
factors that determined the amount of foreign earnings that was subject to the Act’s
favorable holiday rates, managers may be classifying as permanently reinvested
earnings as much foreign profits as possible to maximize the amount of PRE,
particularly if they believe that there will be future tax holidays or other rate
reductions for foreign earnings.83 According to its FY 2013 10-K, Dell classified

80
81
82

83

Graham et al., p. 418.
Graham et al., p. 418.
“High and Low Finance – Tax Break for Profits Went Awry,” The New York
Times, June 4, 2009. Professor Steines points out in his report that Dell also
repatriated approximately $8.8 billion through an internal restructuring “much
or perhaps all of it without incurring residual U.S. tax.” (Steines Report, ¶ 7).
Graham et al., p. 418.
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at least some of its earnings as PRE, 84 and Professor Hubbard notes that his
estimated $6.3 million deferred tax liability associated with a hypothetical
repatriation of Dell’s foreign earnings as of the Appraisal Date was identified by
Dell as having been postponed “indefinitely.”85
41.

A leading valuation textbook further supports this notion, pointing out

that “Multinational companies sometimes do not repatriate earnings (cash) back to
their home country in order to defer taxation on that income. … [T]he tax a
multinational company faces is often determined by its repatriation policy. In this
case, the accumulation of excess cash may create value for shareholders because of
its interplay with the taxes the entity pays.”86
42.

Further, a company that wishes to repatriate cash may wait for tax

holidays, which are government incentive programs that offer tax reduction or
elimination to businesses. In January 2015, Senators Rand Paul and Barbara Boxer
proposed a 6.5% tax on repatriated funds provided those funds were used for
initiatives like research and development, public-private partnerships, and

84

85
86

Dell FY 2013 10-K, p. 50 (“We have provided for the U.S. federal tax liability
on these amounts for financial statement purposes, except for foreign earnings
that are considered permanently reinvested outside of the U.S.”)
Hubbard Report, ¶ 269; see also Shay Report, ¶ 48.
Holthausen, Robert W., and Mark E. Zmjiewski, Corporate Valuation: Theory,
Evidence & Practice, 1st Ed., Cambridge Business Publishers, 2014, pp. 149150.
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acquisitions, and such funds could not be used for executive compensation or stock
buybacks.87
43.

There are many economic benefits of tax holidays.88 A 2009 Decision

Economics study concluded that lowering the tax on repatriated foreign income
would inject $545 billion into the U.S. economy, stimulate 2010 real GDP by $110
million, and result in 614,000 new jobs. In addition, this study projected that the
U.S. Treasury would receive an average of $28 billion annual revenue for five
years that it otherwise would not have received.89
44.

Professor Hubbard selectively cites two valuation textbooks as

support for his use of Dell’s marginal tax rate to calculate his terminal period cash
flows.90 In one of those texts, the author (Professor Damodaran) concedes that his
87

88

89

90

“Two Senators Have Proposed a Tax Holiday Tech Companies Would Love,”
Business Insider, January 29, 2015.
See “Larry Kudlow’s Brilliant Idea for a Tax Holiday,” Motley Fool, October
20, 2010; Larry Kudlow, “The economy could explode on the upside,” Real
Clear Markets, October 6, 2010; Michelle Lodge, “Will a Tax Break for
Multinationals Create Jobs?,” CNBC, July 28 2010; Allen Sinai, “A $545
Billion Private Stimulus Plan,” The Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2009.
Allen Sinai, “A $545 Billion Private Stimulus Plan,” The Wall Street Journal,
January 28, 2009
Damodaran (Investment Valuation, 3rd Ed.), asserts that using a marginal tax
rate in calculating the terminal value is “good practice,” (p. 252) and Giri S.
(Investment Banking: Concepts, Analysis, and Cases) relies on Damodaran in
concluding that “[i]n measuring the FCFF [Free Cash Flow to the Firm] for the
purpose of arriving at the terminal value … it is always the marginal tax rate
that has to be used since all deferred tax assets get naturalized over a period of
time and the company will eventually pay tax at the marginal rate.” (p. 218)
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approach is “conservative” and that the tax effect of repatriating offshore cash is
“not so clear in the long term” due to the potential for tax holidays and changes in
the tax rate.91 Furthermore, other valuation textbooks dispute this practice. For
example, Valuation, 5th Edition, notes: “In actuality, many companies will never
pay (or at least significantly delay paying) accrual-based taxes. Consequently, a
cash tax rate (one based on the operating taxes actually paid in cash to the
government) represents value better than accrual-based taxes.”92 Elsewhere, it
states: “Computing operating taxes by multiplying operating profit by the
company’s statutory tax rate typically leads to an upward-biased estimate of
operating taxes because it fails to recognize that foreign earnings are often taxed at
different levels.”93 In my textbook, I maintain that the proper practice is to use
estimated cash taxes in a DCF analysis.94
45.

Finally, none of the DCF valuations of Dell in the record use a

marginal tax rate for the terminal value in their baseline valuations of Dell as a
going concern, although some of the valuations did consider repatriation scenarios
for sensitivity purposes.95 (See Exhibit 4.)

91
92
93
94

95

Investment Valuation, 3rd Ed., pp. 427-28.
Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 536.
Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 535.
Cornell, Bradford, Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and
Decision Making (“Corporate Valuation”), p. 113.
J.P. Morgan and Evercore used marginal rates in their sensitivity analyses
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F. Other Minor Differences Between Hubbard and Cornell Projections
46.

In addition to the adjustments I discuss above, Professor Hubbard’s

and my DCF valuations differ slightly in their treatment of Dell’s projected stockbased compensation (“SBC”) expense, depreciation and amortization expense,
investment in net working capital, capital expenditures, restructuring charges, and
the projections for the stub period of the FY 2014 projections between the
valuation date and close of the fiscal year end in early 2015.
Stock-Based Compensation and Incremental Opex
47.

In order to model the cash flow impact from Dell’s use of stock-based

compensation, I adopt the method used by the Special Committee’s advisors and
estimate FY 2014 to FY 2018 SBC expense of $362 million, which equals the
actual SBC expense in FY 2012 and is identical to amounts projected for Dell in
each of these years by the Special Committee’s advisors in the BCG cases in their
where they analyzed the effect on value of repatriating cash as part of the LBO
transaction rather than the effect on Dell as a going concern public company. In
contrast, the advisors’ DCF valuation analyses of Dell as a going concern
calculated the Company’s terminal value based on multiples of EBITDA but
still explicitly showed the tax rate during the terminal period to be 21%.
(Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 52-53; JPM_0003324.xlsm; JPM_0119609.xlsm;
EVERCORE00004835.xlsm; EVERCORE00051053.xlsm.) BCG used taxadjusted cash balances in its DCF analysis that was presented to Dell’s Board of
Directors in January 2013 to reflect potential repatriation of offshore cash, but
Mr. Ning testified that BCG did not perform any analysis to determine whether
Dell, as a going concern, publicly-traded company would need to repatriate
offshore cash. (BCG00013575.xlsx (Ning Exhibit 18), “Value Range” Tab;
Ning Deposition, p. 194.)
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fairness opinion DCF valuations.96 I deduct SBC expense in arriving at the
operating profit amount used to calculate Dell’s cash taxes in each year, thereby
deducting an after-tax amount of $286 million in each year ($362 million
multiplied by 1 less the 21.0% tax rate).97 Professor Hubbard uses this same SBC
expense in his BCG 25% Case model but applies a different tax rate such that his
after-tax deduction is $243 million in FY 2015 – 2017. He then models SBC
expense as a constant percentage of FY 2017 Revenues beyond FY 2018, which
results in lower after-tax SBC expense in each year than I project.98 Had Professor
Hubbard instead used my estimate of after-tax SBC expense, his DCF valuations
would have been lower by $0.39 per share in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case
model and by $0.10 per share in the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case model. (See
Revised Exhibit 1.)
48.

In the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case model, Professor Hubbard

includes both Incremental Opex and SBC expense.99 The Incremental Opex
amount is what is referred to in the September 2013 Silver Lake presentation as

96

97

98
99

Silver Lake Partners, Project Denali, September 2013, (Durban Exhibit 19), p.
13; JPM_0013172.xlsm, tab: “PL”; EVERCORE00004835.xlsm, tab: “BCG
Total”; and Dell 2012 10-K, p. 61.
See, e.g., Cornell Report, Exhibits 1E & 10 for BCG 50% Case projections and
DCF valuation.
Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 198-199, fn 257; Hubbard Report, Exhibit 18.
Hubbard Bank Case DCF Model.xlsx, “Opex” tab, cells J33:N33, S33:W33.
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Incremental Cash LTI (i.e., long-term incentives).100 As Silver Lake’s presentation
points out, the Bank Case includes Incremental Cash LTI expense as a private
company replacement for SBC expense.101 In my Bank Case with Cost Savings
scenario, I remove Incremental Cash LTI as a private company expense to avoid
this double-counting and instead include management’s projections for Dell’s SBC
expense as a publicly traded company.102 Had Professor Hubbard excluded the
Incremental Opex amount from his Adjusted Bank Case projections, his estimate
of Dell’s value would increase by $1.24 per share. (See Revised Exhibit 1.)
Other Differences
49.

In his Adjusted Bank Case Projections, Professor Hubbard also

includes after-tax restructuring expense that Silver Lake described as “ongoing
business rationalization and cost initiatives.”103 I did not include these payments in
my estimate of Dell’s fair value on a going concern basis because the cost savings
in the Bank Case projections were based on $3.6 billion of specifically-identified
initiatives that were already in place at the time the projections were created.104
100
101

102
103

104

Project Denali, September 2013, p. 13.
Project Denali, September 2013, p. 13 (“$275 million annual incremental cash
LTI granted in FY 2014E to reflect private company compensation plan;
incremental to converted RSUs to cash awards”).
Cornell Report, fn. 237.
Hubbard Bank Case DCF Model.xlsx, “DCF Control” tab, Cells G102:K102;
Dell Exhibit 25 (August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation), p. 54.
Dell Exhibit 25 (August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation), pp. 26-27.
35

However, as Michael Dell’s testimony makes clear, not all of Dell’s cost savings
initiatives were reflected in the Bank Case. Rather, Silver Lake modeled several
billion dollars in cost reduction and savings in addition to the $3.6 billion shown in
the Bank Case.105 Further, neither Silver Lake’s representative nor Dell
management testified that restructuring costs were part of Dell’s ongoing
operations had the company not gone private, nor were these costs shown as part of
the Bank Case operating projections shown in the Dell’s Rating Agency
Presentation.106 Thus, I believe it is appropriate to exclude these costs in
estimating Dell’s fair going concern value based on the Bank Case with Cost
Savings projections.107
50.

Revised Exhibit 1 also shows the aggregate valuation effect of small

changes between Professor Hubbard’s valuation conclusion using his Adjusted
BCG Case projections and my DCF valuation using the BCG 50% Case
projections due to differences in our projections of Dell’s depreciation and
amortization expense ($0.15 per share), investment in net working capital ($0.20

105

Dell Deposition, pp. 217-220.
Dell Exhibit 25 (August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation), p. 55.
107
If the Court decides that such costs should be included in estimating Dell’s fair
value as a publicly traded company, my concluded value of Dell based on my
DCF valuation using the Bank Case with Cost Savings projections would
decrease by $0.28 per share (see Revised Exhibit 1) and my overall concluded
value, which is based on a 50% weighting of the results of the Bank Case with
Cost Savings DCF valuation, would decrease by $0.14 per share.
106
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per share), and capital expenditures (-$0.23 per share).108 Finally, Revised Exhibit
1 shows that Professor Hubbard’s DCF value per share would be $0.05 per share
lower had he assumed the same percentage of annual cash flows allocated to the
Q4 FY 2014 stub period to account for the period between the valuation date and
close of the fiscal year end in early 2015.
IV.

PROFESSOR HUBBARD IMPROPERLY IGNORES THE IMPACT
OF DELL’S EXPECTED COST SAVINGS
51.

In selecting the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and Hubbard Adjusted

Bank Case forecasts as the basis for his valuation of Dell, Professor Hubbard fails
to take account of cost savings that Dell had already realized prior to the
transaction. By doing so, his Adjusted BCG Case forecast underestimates Dell’s
value by $3.52 per share and his Bank Case forecast underestimates Dell’s value
by $4.20 per share (see Revised Exhibit 1).
52.

I used versions of the BCG and Bank Case projections, but which

appropriately incorporated the extent of the cost savings plans in place, in arriving
at my estimate of Dell’s fair value as of the Appraisal Date. As I explain below,
my decision to use the BCG 50% Case and Bank Case with Cost Savings
108

These differences arise due to the different treatment in modeling these line
items in my forecast (i.e., by using the advisors’ forecasts for the explicit
forecast period and by growing at the 1% PGR in the terminal period) compared
to Professor Hubbard’s use of the BCG balance sheet projections for Property
& Equipment and Net Working Capital.
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projections is supported by evidence in the record regarding Dell’s success in
implementing its cost savings initiatives at a pace that far exceeds that
contemplated in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections.
A.

Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case Projections

53.

In creating the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections, Professor

Hubbard fails to take into account evidence in the record that, at the time of the
transaction, Dell had achieved approximately 50% of the forecasted cost savings at
a faster pace than was originally forecast. As I noted in the Cornell Report, there is
ample evidence in the record regarding the implementation of the cost savings
initiatives and its impact on actual results during Dell’s fiscal year (“FY”) 2014 to
support the conclusion that Dell could reasonably be expected to achieve at least
50% of its projected costs savings as of the Appraisal Date.109
54.

In particular, Dell significantly exceeded the planned cost savings for

FY 2014 of $84 million in the BCG 25% Case and $168 million in the BCG 50%
Case,110 having realized $1.6 billion in these savings in that year, with another $1.5
billion expected to be realized in FY 2015.111 And BCG’s representative Lutao
Ning acknowledged in his deposition that BCG’s Base Case should be

109
110
111

Cornell Report, ¶¶ 43, 45, 57.
Cornell Report, Exhibit 1B (referencing JPM_0119609.xls; tab BCG-Total).
Dell Rating Agency Presentation, April 2014 (Ning Exhibit 26), p. 19.
(DELLE00216698-216732 at 216702.)
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supplemented with the cost savings actually achieved, an amount that
approximated BCG’s 50% Case.112 As I noted in the Cornell Report, Dell was on a
pace to exceed even the rate of annual cost savings shown in the BCG Case, which
forecast $251 million in FY 2014 and $1.3 billion in FY 2015.113 Further, Michael
Dell has admitted that at least some of the cost savings contributed to Dell’s betterthan-expected post-transaction performance.114
B.

Bank Case Projections

55.

Professor Hubbard downplays the relevance of the Bank Case

projections by claiming that they contain elements of private company savings
(e.g., lower investment in working capital) and are overly optimistic.115 This
conclusion ignores Mr. Gladden’s testimony that the Bank Case projections were
informed by Silver Lake’s due diligence process and that he and his team reviewed
and agreed with the key assumptions underlying the projections at the time they
were created.116
56.

Further, Professor Hubbard does not cite any evidence to support his

conclusion that the Bank Case includes private company savings. To the contrary,
112

Ning Deposition, p. 269 (“Q: … So would it have been reasonable to rely on
the 25% forecast? A: It could have been – it was reasonable to rely on – if they
had already achieved the 50%, then it was reasonable to rely on 50%.”).
113
Cornell Report, ¶ 45, Exhibit 1B.
114
Dell Deposition, p. 310.
115
Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 178-79.
116
Gladden Deposition, pp. 232-237, 240-241.
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the August 2013 ratings agency presentation gives a detailed account of the
strategies Michael Dell and Silver Lake intended to pursue for Dell as a private
company.117 Every one of these strategies (gain PC and server market share, more
aggressively targeting certain commercial accounts, investing in sales coverage
and integrated solutions for mid-market customers, and developing localized
products and solutions and enhancing go-to market capabilities in emerging
markets)118 was possible for Dell to implement as a public company,119 and the
Bank Case projections included in the presentation already take account of these
strategies.120 Professor Hubbard does not provide any supporting evidence to show
which savings were possible as a private company as opposed to a public one. In
general, the most significant cost savings brought about by going private is the
avoidance of regulatory filing and reporting costs.121 I’ve found no evidence in the
record that such a savings would impact Dell’s cash flows in a material way.122

117
118
119
120
121

122

Dell Exhibit 25 (Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), p. 29.
Dell Exhibit 25 (Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), p. 29.
See Durban Deposition, pp. 170-178; see, also, Dell Deposition, pp. 155-156.
Dell Exhibit 25 (Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), p. 55
See Amihud, Yacov, “The Characteristics and Effects of Management
Buyouts,” in Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and Consequences,
edited by Yacov Amihud, Beard Books, 2002, p. 25.
For example, the August 2013 Rating Agency did not show filing and reporting
costs in its detailed breakdown of the cost savings. (Dell Exhibit 25, pp. 2627). See, also, Durban Exhibit 19 (Project Denali, September 2013), pp. 81-83
(DELLE00239046-48).
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57.

In contrast with Professor Hubbard’s claims that the Bank Case

projections contain much lower expense levels, Exhibit 7 demonstrates that
Corporate General & Administrative Expense as a percentage of Revenues in the
Bank Case and Bank Case with Cost Savings projections are not materially lower
than Dell experienced in FY 2009 – 2013. Similarly, Dell’s projected EBITDA
margin in the Bank Case is in line with Dell’s actual experience during FY 2009 –
2013 and is projected to be only slightly higher in FY 2017 – 2018 when
incremental cost savings are taken into account. Exhibit 8 demonstrates that while
the Bank Case projects lower net working capital investment than either the
September 21 or BCG Case projections, total net reinvestment is projected to be
higher than the BCG Base Case in FY 2015, 2016, 2018 and is also projected to be
higher than the September 21 Case in FY 2017 and 2018.
58.

Professor Hubbard also ignores the $1 billion in incremental cost

savings included in the Bank Case projections even though he has not provided any
evidence that these cost savings could not be achieved by Dell as a going concern,
public company.123 And, in fact, they are the same type of cost savings that
management was in the process of implementing prior to the transaction.124 Dell’s
management provided Silver Lake with the information used to describe the cost
123

124

Durban Deposition, pp. 309-312; Dell Deposition, pp. 216-217, 259-261; and
Gladden Deposition, pp. 247-249.
Cornell Report, ¶ 80.
41

reduction opportunities included in the August 2013 Rating Agency
Presentation.125 This presentation showed initiatives that were expected to result in
$3.6 billion in annual productivity cost savings in order to maintain and improve
competitive positioning.126 These additional cost savings are shown in a
September 2013 Silver Lake Presentation as incremental cost savings of $500
million in FY 2015 and $1 billion in each of the years FY 2016-2018.127 As noted
above, Dell actually exceeded the planned cost savings for FY 2014, having
realized $1.6 billion of these savings in that year, with another $1.5 billion in cost
savings expected in 2015.128
59.

Exhibit 9 presents an analysis of EBITDA margins in BCG 25%

Case, BCG 50% Case, Bank Case, and Bank Case with Cost Savings projections.
The exhibit demonstrates that the Bank Case with Cost Savings projections start
out below those for both BCG cases in FY 2014 and 2015, but increase over time
such that they fall in between those projected by the BCG 25% Case and BCG
50% Case in FY 2016 and 2017. In contrast, the Bank Case projections that
Professor Hubbard further adjusts downward do not rebound to the level of margin
125

126
127

128

August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation (Gladden Exhibit 28), p. 26
(DELL00024949); Gladden Deposition, pp. 240-241.
Gladden Exhibit 28, pp. 26-27.
Silver Lake Partners, Project Denali, September 2013, (Durban Exhibit 19), p.
13.
Dell Rating Agency Presentation, April 2014 (Ning Exhibit 26), p. 19.
(DELLE00216698-216732 at 216702.)
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projected in the BCG case projections until FY 2017. As I discussed above and in
the Cornell Report, the failure to incorporate the impact of these projected cost
savings in a forecast for purposes of valuing Dell is inconsistent with the record
evidence as of the Appraisal Date.
V.

PROFESSOR HUBBARD’S NON-OPERATING ASSET AND
LIABILITY ADJUSTMENTS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER
VALUATIONS IN THE RECORD
60.

In this section, I analyze differences between Professor Hubbard’s and

my assumptions regarding the proper adjustments to make to Dell’s estimated
enterprise value (i.e., the value of its operating assets) in order to arrive at an
estimate of Dell’s equity value.129 In particular, Professor Hubbard and I use
different estimates of Dell’s Net Debt (i.e., Cash less Total Debt) as of the

129

Professor Hubbard also used a different method of estimating Dell’s diluted
shares outstanding. In particular, he used Dell’s shares outstanding as of
August 22, 2013 of 1.758 million and added an additional 7 million shares to
reflect the reported impact of dilution from options, restricted stock units and
shares for the three month period ended August 2, 2013 from Dell’s 2Q FY
2014 Form 10-Q filing. (Hubbard Report, ¶ 272.) In contrast, I started with the
same basic shares outstanding but used detail on the exercise prices and vesting
schedules for the outstanding options and restricted stock units and shares to
estimate the impact of dilution relative to my concluded equity value per share.
(Cornell Report, fn. 277.) Professor Hubbard’s approach is approximately
correct (and in his case overstates dilution) because his valuation is lower than
the transaction price (which approximates the Dell stock price that the
Company would have used to estimate dilution for financial accounting
purposes). My approach is more precise and allows me to estimate dilution for
fair value conclusions that differ materially from Dell’s actual stock price.
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Appraisal Date. Moreover, Professor Hubbard inappropriately omits $5 billion in
cash from Dell’s total cash balance and deducts approximately $5 billion in net tax
liabilities. Taken together, these adjustments underestimate Professor Hubbard’s
estimate of Dell’s fair value using the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections by
$5.59 per share and using the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case by $5.60 per share (see
Revised Exhibit 1).
A. Professor Hubbard Improperly Omits $5 Billion in “Required” Cash
from his Valuation
61.

Professor Hubbard states that “[i]f a firm has more cash than is

necessary for its ongoing operations, the excess cash is a valuable non-operating
asset of the firm and should be added to the DCF valuation” and concludes that
“Dell had more cash on the Merger date than it required for its ongoing
operations.”130 Professor Hubbard relied upon the August 2013 Rating Agency
Presentation and Dell’s post-transaction cash balance to conclude that Dell
required approximately $5 billion in cash to fund its ongoing operations.131 He
then deducted this $5 billion amount from his estimate of Dell’s cash balance of
$11.04 billion as of October 29, 2013 to arrive at excess cash of $6.04 billion.132
Professor Hubbard’s methodology has the effect of lowering his implied per share

130
131
132

Hubbard Report, ¶ 261.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 262.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 263.
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equity value by $2.83 per share ($5.0 billion divided by 1.765 million diluted
shares outstanding).133 (See Revised Exhibit 1.)
62.

The amount of excess cash a company holds depends on the nature of

the underlying business. As Professor Damodaran points out, there are certain
types of businesses, such as a small retail firm that engages in a lot of cash
transactions, which may require a substantial operating cash balance.134 Other
businesses, such as a manufacturing company in a developed market, may not need
any operating cash. Operating cash should be viewed as part of a company’s
working capital requirements, and any excess cash and near-cash investments can
be added to the value of the company’s operating assets. As I have described in
the Cornell Report,135 Dell is a long-established global company with extensive
worldwide manufacturing operations, such that it is reasonable to conclude that
Dell’s operating cash needs are already accounted for in the working capital
forecasts that are part of its cash flow projections.136

133
134
135
136

Hubbard Report, ¶ 272.
Investment Valuation, 3rd Ed., pp. 423-424.
Cornell Report, ¶¶ 10-13, 39-40.
Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 137. (“Operating working capital equals operating current
assets minus operating current liabilities. Operating current assets comprise all
current assets necessary for the operation of the business, including working
cash balances, trade accounts receivable, inventory and prepaid expenses.”)
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63.

Thus, Professor Hubbard appears to be double-counting Dell’s cash

requirements. Both the BCG Base Case and Bank Case projections show that
Dell’s working capital needs (including operating cash) were projected to increase
over time as the Company carried out its business plan.137 This projected increase
in net working capital is shown as an offset to free cash flow. Both the BCG and
Bank Case projections used by Professor Hubbard include projected changes in
working capital, and Professor Hubbard does not provide any evidence that these
projections did not include projected cash used in Dell’s operations. In fact, the
support that Professor Hubbard relies on for concluding that Dell’s excess cash
balance is only $6 billion does not consider Dell’s working capital forecasts at all
and does not support his implicit assertion that additional amounts beyond Dell’s
forecasted working capital needs should be deducted from Dell’s cash balance.138
Rather, the BCG Base Case projections used by Professor Hubbard in his analysis
directly contradict this assertion because the BCG DCF analyses add total cash
rather than excess cash to arrive at Dell’s equity value.139

137

BCG00013575.xlsx (Ning Exhibit 18), “Total Base” tab; DELLE00734152.xls,
“Consolidated” tab.
138
Denali Acquiror Inc., Rating Agency Presentation, p. 38 (DELLE00381224);
LBO Project Update, Treasury Ops, September 3, 2013, p. 12
(DELLE00382674).
139
See BCG00013575.xlsx (Ning Exhibit 18), “Value Range” tab.
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64.

Using a company’s total cash and marketable securities to calculate

firm value from enterprise value is a commonly accepted procedure. For example,
a leading valuation textbook states that “[o]nce you value the operating assets, you
can add the value of the cash and marketable securities to arrive at firm value…”140
Another textbook states that “[t]o value the firm, we add the value of all of the cash
and marketable securities to the enterprise value,”141 and a leading investment
banking text confirms this relationship.142
65.

To examine whether Professor Hubbard’s methodology of adding

excess cash to a company’s enterprise value is a commonly accepted practice, I
reviewed twelve sets of DCF analyses which value Dell between May 24, 2012
and January 31, 2014 (see Exhibit 4). Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these
analyses used total cash rather than excess cash in calculating firm value.143 In
140

141

142

143

Damodaran, Aswath, Investment Valuation, 3rd Ed., John Wiley & Sons, 2012,
p. 425.
Holthausen, Robert W. and Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation: Theory,
Evidence & Practice First Edition: Cambridge Business Publishers (2014), p.
564
Rosenbaum, Joshua and Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking: Valuation,
Leveraged Buyouts and Mergers & Acquisitions, Second Ed., John Wiley &
Sons, 2013, p. 35.
Three of these analyses (Morgan Stanley, Citi, Morningstar, and the Houlihan
Lokey October 2013 Solvency Presentation) do not include long-term
investments in calculating the total cash balance as I do. However, my
inclusion of long-term investments is an appropriate addition to enterprise value
in calculating a company’s equity value per share since neither interest income
nor dividends on those investments are included in the free cash flow
projections.
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fact, only one analysis, an Ernst & Young ASC 805 valuation, takes excess cash
into account, and this was a purchase price allocation analysis for financial
reporting purposes that did not purport to independently value Dell.144 Even so,
the total cash adjustments made by Ernst & Young are significantly less than those
proposed by Professor Hubbard.145 My review of these valuations confirms that
adding total cash to enterprise value is commonly accepted practice.
B. Professor Hubbard Improperly Understates Dell’s Net Cash as a Going
Concern as of the Appraisal Date by Including Transaction-Related
Items
66.

Professor Hubbard and I also used different estimates of Dell’s net

cash balance as of the Appraisal Date.146 In my analysis, I use Dell’s adjusted
October 29, 2013 total cash of $12.469 billion and total debt of $6.311 billion to
arrive at net cash of $6.158 billion.147 Professor Hubbard estimated Dell’s total net
cash to be $5.986 billion ($11.04 billion cash less $5.054 billion in debt).148
144

145

146

147
148

Dell Inc. ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young,
DELLE00733762-4129 at 4117. According to ASC 805, the purpose of such a
valuation is to allocate the purchase consideration paid among various balance
sheet items (assets and liabilities) for financial reporting and tax purposes
(ASC 805-740-25-6).
Ernst & Young’s analysis adds $1.19 billion in “illiquid” cash and another $765
million in “excess” cash. See Ernst & Young ASC 805 Valuation Analysis
(DELLE00734117).
Because any differences in a company’s total cash and total debt balances could
arise due to paying off debt, it is more appropriate to look at a company’s net
cash (or net debt, if debt exceeds cash) balance instead.
Cornell Report, Appendix G.
Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 261, 264 and Exhibit 21. This amount does not take into
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Professor Hubbard’s lower net cash estimate (by $0.72 billion) results in his
implied equity value per share being lower than mine by $0.10 per share.149 (See
Revised Exhibit 1.)
67.

In order to accurately measure Dell’s going concern net cash levels as

of the Appraisal Date (i.e., the level of net cash Dell would have had as of the
Appraisal Date had the Buyout Transaction not taken place), it is necessary to
exclude items such as redemption of investments and cash transfers into escrow
accounts that took place between August 2150 and October 29, 2013 since these
items would not have taken place absent the Transaction and impact the net cash
position (i.e., do not involve an equal reduction in cash and debt balances).151 As a
result, I adjusted Professor Hubbard’s October 29, 2013 debt amount of $5.054
billion by adding back $1.506 billion in transaction-related debt repayments and

149
150

151

account Professor Hubbard’s estimate of cash used in Dell’s operations of
“approximately $5 billion,” which would reduce his net cash balance to $0.986
billion. (Hubbard Report, p. 134.)
Hubbard Report, ¶ 272 (based on his 1.765 million diluted shares outstanding).
August 2, 2013 is the end of Dell’s second quarter of fiscal 2014. See Dell Inc.,
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended August 2, 2013 (“Dell Inc. 2Q FY 2014 10Q”).
Both Professor Hubbard’s debt and cash amounts are understated because he
improperly deducts a transaction-related repayment of approximately $1.3
billion in structured finance debt. (Denali Holding Inc. Quarterly Report,
November 1, 2014 (DELLE00292678-720), p. 24.) However, this repayment
should have no impact on net cash since it results in a decrease to both cash and
debt of approximately $1.3 billion.
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deducting $249 million in transaction-related debt proceeds.152 Similarly, I added
back $172 million in transaction-related cash expenditures along with the $1.506
billion in transaction-related debt repayments and deducting the $249 million in
transaction-related proceeds from debt issuances from Dell’s cash balance as of
October 28, 2013. (See Revised Exhibit 10.)
C. Professor Hubbard Improperly Adjusts Dell’s Fair Value for Potential
Tax Assets and Liabilities
FIN 48 Liability
68.

In his report, Professor Hubbard reduces his estimate of Dell’s

enterprise value by $3.01 billion to ostensibly take into account a potential tax
liability reflected in Dell’s financial statements as of the Appraisal Date.153
Professor Hubbard’s inclusion of the FIN 48 liability reduces his implied per share
equity value by $1.71 per share in both his BCG 25% Case and his Bank Case
scenarios. (See Revised Exhibit 1.) To support this adjustment, he states that
“[i]n addition to debt, other debt-like liabilities not related to the ongoing
operations of the company should be subtracted from the DCF value” and that
Dell’s historical financial statements show a very large liability related to past tax
returns in various countries.154 Although I agree, as a general proposition, that a

152

See Cornell Report, ¶ 113 and Appendix G.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 267.
154
Hubbard Report, ¶ 265.
153
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company’s non-operating liabilities should be subtracted from its DCF value to the
extent they reflect additional cash outflows that are not reflected in the DCF
analysis, I disagree with Professor Hubbard’s implicit conclusion that FIN 48
provides a reliable measure of Dell’s potential future tax liability that is not already
taken into account by the estimates of projected cash taxes shown in the BCG Base
Case and Bank Case cash flow projections.
69.

According to FASB Interpretation No. 48 (“FIN 48”), companies

must establish a contingent liability on their balance sheets for potential future tax
payments, i.e., taxes that might have to be paid in the future.155 Professor Hubbard
acknowledges that FIN 48 liability is “a measure of the expected tax payments
associated with tax positions that the company may lose if it is challenged by the
tax authority.”156 These expected tax payments represent the difference between
tax positions recognized on a company’s tax return and those recognized on its
income statement for financial reporting purposes (i.e., using accrual accounting)

155

156

Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 265-266. Professor Shay agrees with Professor Hubbard’s
treatment. (Shay Report, ¶ 62.)
Hubbard Report, ¶ 266 (emphasis added). According to the FASB’s Summary
of Interpretation No. 48, this recorded amount is an estimate of the total amount
at risk given a determination that the risk of not owing this amount is not more
likely than not assuming a 100% likelihood of being audited.
<http://www.fasb.org/summary/finsum48.shtml>
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and do not take into account the likelihood or effects of possible settlement with
taxing authorities. 157
70.

Further, Professor Hubbard does not cite any valuation texts to

support his inclusion of the FIN 48 liability in calculating Dell’s equity value.
None of the major valuation texts I have reviewed suggest reducing a company’s
enterprise value by its unadjusted FIN 48 liability. In addition, only three of the
twelve valuations of Dell in the record (the Ernst & Young ASC 805 purchase
allocation valuation and the Houlihan Lokey October 2013 and January 31, 2014
valuations) include offsets for tax liabilities (see Exhibit 4). Each of these three
valuations of Dell was performed for financial accounting purposes, not to
determine Dell’s independent, fair value as a going concern.158 Thus, I believe it is
157

158

Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Interpretation No. 48:
Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, (hereinafter referred to as “FIN
48”), Appendix A, p. 17.
These valuations make several non-standard adjustments. For example, the
Ernst &Young valuation adds the value of the Dell trade name and DFS’
receivables as additional assets and subtracts additional net working capital
beyond that shown in the cash flow forecasts and FIN 48 liability. E&Y’s use
of these adjustments may be appropriate in an ASC 805 valuation used to
allocate the purchase price of an acquired company amount various balance
sheet items, but in my experience these are not standard adjustments for
purposes of arriving at an independent estimate of a company’s intrinsic value.
(DELLE00733762-4129 at 4117; ASC 805-740-25-6.) The two Houlihan
Lokey valuations show Dell’s estimate of between $800 and $850 million
(October 2013) and between $835 and $865 million (January 31, 2014) for “tax
and legal expenses” but do not provide any further detail as to the breakdown
between these categories. (Dell Inc., Discussion Materials, October 2013, p. 13
(DELLE00780000) and Denali Holdings, Inc., Valuation Analysis as of January
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inappropriate to rely on these valuations in determining whether a FIN 48 liability
should be deducted from Dell’s enterprise value.159
71.

Moreover, a FIN 48 liability is measured by comparing projected cash

tax expense under a worst case scenario with accrual-based tax expense recorded
in that company’s financial statements.160 It does not measure the extent to which
a given set of cash flow projections may or may not understate projected cash tax
expense. As such, it is irrelevant in a DCF valuation context and should not be
used to adjust projected cash taxes paid as shown in a set of cash flow projections.
72.

I therefore conclude that the inclusion of a FIN 48 liability is

speculative and inconsistent with standard practices of valuing companies on a
going concern, fair value basis.

31, 2014, p. 3.)
Moreover, the $3 billion FIN 48 liability used by Professor Hubbard is far in
excess of the $800-$850M in “estimated exposure of certain tax and legal
claims” that Houlihan Lokey assumed as contingent liabilities in its October
2013 solvency opinion (i.e., a valuation done for financial accounting purposes
rather than for the purpose of determining Dell’s intrinsic value).
(DELLE00779987 at p. 11.) I note that the Houlihan Lokey valuations use tax
rates of 15.0% (October 2013 valuation) and 17.0% (January 31, 2013
valuation), which are lower than my assumed effective tax rate of 21.0%, and
this may account for Houlihan Lokey’s conclusion that some amount of
additional tax liability might need to be taken into account. (Dell Inc.,
Discussion Materials, October 2013, p. 13 (DELLE00780000); Denali
Holdings, Inc., Valuation Analysis as of January 31, 2014, p. 3.)
160
FIN 48, Appendix A, p. 17.
159
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Deferred Tax Liability
73.

According to Professor Hubbard, Dell has $6.3 billion of deferred

taxes that need to be paid on overseas profits that have not yet been repatriated. He
relied on Professor Shay for this assumption161 and stated that “while this tax
liability is currently identified as being ‘indefinitely’ overseas, at some point it will
not be possible for Dell to continue deferring this liability. Similar to the
accumulated overseas deferrals as of October 29, 2014, the additional deferrals
resulting from the difference between the marginal rate of 35.8 percent and the
lower tax rates modeled during the projection and transition periods would also
need to be eventually recognized and paid.”162 Professor Hubbard’s inclusion of
the Deferred Tax liability reduces his implied per share equity value by $1.25 per
161

162

Professor Shay recommended that Professor Hubbard use a 25-year payment
period for purportedly deferred taxes because the latter’s DCF analysis
“calculates the cash flows of the enterprise that are available as returns to the
investors or reinvestment anywhere in the business,” and concluded without
further explanation that “it is inconsistent to assume that these earnings will
never be subject to U.S. tax.” (Shay Report, ¶ 51)
Hubbard Report, ¶ 269. Professor Hubbard modeled these deferred liabilities as
accumulating and deferring to the terminal period and then being paid off over
time. He carried the $6.3 billion amount forward to the terminal year but did
not increase the amount over time. He then added to the $6.3 billion the yearby-year additional deferrals of the tax amounts resulting from the difference
between the 18.5% rate he used during the forecast period and the 35.8% rate
he used during the terminal period. He then assumed straight-line repayment
over a 25-year period starting in the terminal year. He discounted these
calculations at his WACC estimate of 9.46% to arrive at a present value
deferred tax liability of $2.2 billion as of October 29, 2013. (Hubbard Report, ¶
270-71, Hubbard Exhibit 23.)
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share in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and by $1.27 per share in the Hubbard
Adjusted Bank Case valuations. (See Revised Exhibit 1.)
74.

Neither Professor Hubbard nor Professor Shay cites any external

support for the idea that Dell must repatriate its offshore cash “at some point” but
simply conclude that such repatriation must necessarily take place. In fact, I find
no evidence to support an assumption that Dell did not plan to use the profits
earned overseas to support its significant overseas operations.163 Dell had been
investing heavily in its enterprise business in China and had plans to increase its
investment in India, Indonesia, and Brazil, particularly in smaller cities.164 Mr.
Dell testified that Dell expected to double the number of stores in India during FY
2016 and “accelerated the pace of investment” in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam,
Mexico, and other emerging markets “to be able to grow the business longterm.”165 Moreover, Mr. Rajkovic, J.P. Morgan’s representative, testified that Dell
had no plans to repatriate its overseas cash,166 such that it is unclear if and when
any such repatriation would occur. As I described above, there are several ways
corporations can access cash without repatriating “offshore” cash. For these

163

164
165
166

As of FY 2013, Dell operated in over 50 countries and over 50% of its revenue
and at least 40% of its gross profit was earned outside the U.S. (Dell Exhibit 25
(Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), p. 29.)
Gladden Deposition, pp. 202-203.
Dell Deposition, pp. 156-57.
Rajkovic Deposition, p. 52.
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reasons, it is speculative to assume that Dell will necessarily have to repatriate its
“overseas” cash and pay U.S. taxes on those overseas profits.
75.

Further, Professor Hubbard’s Deferred Tax Liability calculation

implies that Dell would not pay a 35.8% marginal tax rate over the 25-year period
beginning in FY 2024, but instead would pay an average effective tax rate of
45.6% in those years. (See Exhibit 11.) As discussed above, this assumption is
inconsistent with Dell’s historical experience of paying far lower than the marginal
tax rate167 and presumes, without any foundation, that Dell will not only pay the
highest marginal tax rate on its current earnings but will also pay taxes on past
earnings in the terminal period.
76.

Valuation texts do not support deducting deferred tax liabilities (or

assets) in arriving at a company’s equity value from its enterprise value. A leading
valuation textbook notes that “[d]eferred tax assets and liabilities classified as
operating will flow through NOPLAT [Net Operating Profit or Loss After Tax] via
cash taxes. As part of NOPLAT, they are also part of free cash flow and are not
valued separately.”168 This approach is seconded by another leading valuation
textbook, which states that “When valuing the equity of a company, we subtract

167

168

Exhibit 5 shows that not only has Dell’s tax rate generally been well below the
marginal rate, it has declined over time.
Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 540.
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the value of the non-equity claims from the value of the firm. However, we do not
include deferred tax liabilities (or add the value of deferred tax assets) when
measuring the value of common equity by taking the value of the firm less the
market value of the non-common equity claims.”169 This is consistent with the use
of tax rates far lower than the marginal tax rate in the terminal value period in both
the BCG 25% Case and the Bank Case projections.
77.

Finally, none of the twelve DCF valuations I have reviewed reduce

Dell’s enterprise value by a deferred foreign income tax liability in arriving at its
equity value. (See Exhibit 4.) For these reasons, I conclude that Professor
Hubbard’s inclusion of a deferred foreign income tax liability as reduction to his
DCF value is speculative and not supported by either the evidence in the record or
standard valuation practice.
Net Operating Loss Carryforwards
78.

Professor Hubbard increases his DCF estimate of Dell’s enterprise

value by $278 million in deferred tax assets related to carryforwards of prior Net
Operating Losses (NOLs) as estimated by Professor Shay.170 This deferred tax
asset has the effect of increasing his per share estimate of Dell’s equity value for

169

Holthausen, Robert W. and Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation: Theory,
Evidence & Practice First Edition: Cambridge Business Publishers (2014), p.
102.
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both his BCG 25% and his Bank Cases by $0.16 per share. (See Revised Exhibit
1.)
79.

None of the twelve DCF analyses I have reviewed includes a deferred

tax asset for Dell’s NOL carryforwards (see Exhibit 4). Further, Professor
Hubbard has not provided any evidence that Dell’s management did not include
the effect of these carryforwards in determining that 21.0% was the appropriate tax
rate to apply in Dell’s projections.
VI.

PROFESSOR HUBBARD’S WACC IS TOO HIGH
80.

I estimated Dell’s WACC to be 9.03%, while Professor Hubbard

estimated Dell’s WACC to be 9.46%,171 which is almost a full percentage point
higher than Dell’s internal WACC estimate of 8.5%.172 Professor Hubbard’s use of
a 9.46% WACC rather than a 9.0% WACC lowers his DCF valuation using the
Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections by $0.57 per share and using the
Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections by $0.75 per share. (See Revised
Exhibit 1.)
170

Hubbard Report, ¶ 268; Shay Report, ¶¶ 57-58.
Cornell Report, ¶ 111 and Exhibit 7; Hubbard Report, ¶ 257 and Exhibit 16. I
based my estimate of Dell’s fair value on the average of my two DCF
valuations using the BCG 50% Case and Bank Case with Additional Cost
Savings projections on a WACC estimate of 9.0%, but also show the sensitivity
of my valuation results to the WACC that Dell used in the normal course of
business (8.5%).
172
DELLE00197210.
171
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81.

The largest driver of the difference in our WACC estimates is

Professor Hubbard’s use of a higher estimate of the market equity risk premium
(6.41%) than I did (5.50%).173 (See Exhibit 12.) I discuss the impact of the equity
risk premium below, as well as why I believe that my choice results in a better
estimate of Dell’s WACC as of the Appraisal Date.174 This difference is offset to a
minor extent by three inputs for which my selected input resulted in an otherwise
higher WACC estimate than did Professor Hubbard’s input: cost of debt, tax rate
and beta. I discuss the impact of these three inputs and why I believe my choices
result in a better estimate of Dell’s WACC in Appendix B.
82.

Professor Hubbard based his estimate of the appropriate forward-

looking market equity risk premium of 6.41% on the average of the historical
(6.70%) and supply side (6.11%) equity risk premium estimates published by

173
174

Hubbard Report, ¶ 250; Cornell Report, ¶ 110.
The two remaining inputs (risk free rate and target capital structure) do not
impact the difference in our WACC estimates. Both Professor Hubbard and I
use the 3.31% yield on 20-year U.S. Treasury Securities as of October 29, 2013
in our calculation of Dell’s WACC. Professor Hubbard uses Dell’s average
debt to total capital ratio calculated on a quarterly basis between January 12,
2011 and January 11, 2013 of 25.25%. (Hubbard Report, Exhibit 11.) I
estimate Dell’s target capital structure to be 24.75% using Dell’s market
capitalization immediately prior to rumors of the Buyout Transaction and its
estimate debt balance as of October 29, 2013 (Cornell Report, ¶ 103). Since we
both assume that Dell’s historical capital structure of approximately 25% will
remain its target going forward, and the difference in estimates of 0.5% in the
debt to total capital ratio does not impact either WACC estimate, I consider
either estimate to be an acceptable input for estimating Dell’s WACC.
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Ibbotson Associates.175 These estimates are based on the long-term arithmetic
average return of stocks over 20-year treasury bonds over the period 1926 to
2012.176
83.

In contrast, I arrived at my estimate of the forward-looking market

equity risk premium of 5.5% based on a current calculation of the implied equity
risk premium based on current market returns, as well as a thorough review of
academic and practitioner literature, and my experience, research, and writings.177
As I noted in the Cornell Report, research by academics and practitioners over the
last 20 years indicates that the forward-looking equity risk premium is significantly
lower than the long-run historical average.178 As a result, it is my opinion that
Professor Hubbard inflates his equity risk premium estimate by placing any weight

175
176
177
178

Hubbard Report, ¶ 250.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 247; 2013 SBBI Valuation Yearbook, p. 66.
Cornell Report, ¶ 110.
See Bradford Cornell, The Equity Risk Premium: The Long-Run Future of the
Stock Market, John Wiley & Sons, 1999; see also Bradford Cornell, “Economic
Growth and Equity Investing,” Financial Analysts Journal, Volume 66, No. 1,
2010; Robert D. Arnott & Peter L. Bernstein, “What Risk Premium Is
“Normal”?,” Financial Analysts Journal, Volume 58, No. 2, March/April 2002;
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, “The Equity Premium,” The Journal of
Finance, Volume LVII, No. 2, April 2002. In addition, surveys of CFOs
consistently report an average equity risk premium significantly lower than the
historical equity risk premium. A survey of 404 CFOs conducted by Professors
John Graham and Campbell Harvey in September 2013 reported an average
equity risk premium of 3.11%. (John R. Graham and Campbell R. Harvey, “The
Equity Risk Premium in 2014,” Duke University Working Paper)
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422008), p. 8.)
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(in his case, 50%) on the historical equity risk premium. Moreover, although the
supply side estimate attempts to correct the historical equity risk premium by
adjusting that estimate to reflect recent expectations of equity returns based on real
earnings growth, the current 6.11% estimate exceeds that of other forward-looking
estimates available as of the Appraisal Date.179 Moreover, in a recent survey of
150 valuation and finance textbooks, the average equity risk premium estimated by
those authors who took current market values into account was 4.8%, and the most
recent five-year moving average estimate recommended by the textbooks was
5.7%.180 Thus, I continue to believe that my estimate of 5.5% represents the
appropriate equity risk premium for purposes of valuating Dell as of October 29,
2013. Had Professor Hubbard instead used by 5.5% equity risk premium estimate,

179

180

Surveys of CFOs consistently report an average equity risk premium
significantly lower than the historical equity risk premium. A survey of 404
CFOs conducted by Professors John Graham and Campbell Harvey in
September 2013 reported an average equity risk premium of 3.11%. (John R.
Graham and Campbell R. Harvey, “The Equity Risk Premium in 2014,” Duke
University Working Paper
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422008), p. 8.) Professor
Damodaran calculates implied equity risk premiums on a monthly basis based
on the required return on the S&P 500 Index (measured using its dividend and
stock buyback yields) less the risk free rate. The monthly ERP for October 2013
was 5.59%. Aswath Damodaran, “Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants,
Estimation and Implications – 2014 Edition,” NYU Stern School of Business,
March 2014, pp. 67-68, 79 (Figure 12 and backup data retrieved from
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/).
Fernandez, Pablo, “The Equity Premium in 150 Textbooks,” Unpublished
Working Paper, January 9, 2015, pp. 2-3.
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his concluded WACC would have been 8.58%, which is almost identical to Dell’s
internal WACC estimate of 8.5%.181 (See Exhibit 12.)
84.

After considering the Hubbard Report, I continue to believe that my

WACC represents the best estimate of Dell’s discount rate as of the Appraisal
Date. I also note that my WACC estimate of 9.0% is closer to Dell’s internal
WACC estimate of 8.5%.
VII.

PROFESSOR HUBBARD INAPPROPRIATELY ASSUMES DELL
SHOULD NOT BE VALUED BASED ON A SUM OF THE PARTS
ANALYSIS
85.

In his report, Professor Hubbard concluded that sum of the parts

(SOTP) analyses were most appropriate for “conglomerates, where there is truly a
collection of free-standing and non-interconnected businesses that could be run
separately or sold with little or no effect on the other businesses.”182 He explains
that an SOTP analysis is not appropriate for Dell because Dell was “highly
integrated and interconnected” and was becoming even more interconnected by
offering integrated “IT solutions” to customers that included hardware, software,
support, and services.183 To support this conclusion, Professor Hubbard cited
testimony by Mr. Rajkovic, who stated that J.P. Morgan did not perform an SOTP

181

DELLE00197210.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 292.
183
Hubbard Report, ¶ 292.
182

62

analysis because Dell’s business “was not separable” and that “the majority of the
businesses within Dell are driven by the core business of PCs” such that they could
not be valued separately, nor could they stand alone as separate entities.184
86.

Professor Hubbard dismissed the fact that sum of the parts analyses

were performed by Dell internally as well as by equity analysts.185 (See Exhibit
13.) Dell’s management, who were more familiar with the Company’s operations
than anyone else (and thus well-aware to the extent those operations were
interconnected), performed these analyses and even recommended to analysts that
they adopt this methodology in order to better understand Dell’s true value.186
87.

Professor Hubbard not only dismisses the importance of a SOTP-type

analysis, but also the use of any companies that are comparable to Dell’s individual
business segments other than Hewlett-Packard Co. (“HP”) when he performed his
estimate of Dell’s fair value based on a comparable company (consolidated)
trading multiples.187 I agreed in the Cornell Report that only HP was comparable
to Dell across most of its business operations, but noted that each segment was
comparable to many companies. 188 Professor Hubbard’s sole choice of HP is also

184
185
186
187
188

Hubbard Report, ¶ 293.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 291.
Mandl Exhibit 25.
Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 289, 298.
Cornell Report, ¶ 125.
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problematic because Michael Dell has testified that “many people would say that
[HP was Dell’s closest competitor], but there’s certainly significant differences
between our business and HP’s business.”189 Further, as I noted in the Cornell
Report, multiples-based valuations “do not necessarily reflect the intrinsic value of
an enterprise but instead may reflect under or over-pricing in the market due to the
economic conditions at the time the trading or transaction multiple is
calculated.”190 This concern is especially problematic where, as in Professor
Hubbard’s analysis, the multiples-based valuation relies not on a large number of
comparable companies for which individual mispricing factors may average out,
but instead on the trading multiple of one company.
88.

Professor Hubbard’s blanket dismissal of the sum of the parts

methodology for valuing Dell ignores its usefulness for testing the reasonableness
of estimates obtained using other methods. Unlike Professor Hubbard, I performed
both SOTP multiples and DCF valuation analyses of Dell to test the reasonableness
of my conclusion of Dell’s fair value based on consolidated DCF valuations.191
While the SOTP DCF analysis included projections for Dell’s segments that
factored in the cost savings expected to accrue over the forecast period, the SOTP
multiples-based analysis based on Dell’s FY 2014 projections would not account
189
190
191

Dell Deposition, p. 231.
Cornell Report, ¶ 125.
Cornell Report, Exhibits 14–18, 20 B&C.
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for the improved profitability and growth projected between FY 2014 and 2018.
As a result, I normalized Dell’s FY 2014 Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
(“EBIT”) and Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization
(EBITDA) projections to reflect the full annual impact of the projected cost
savings.192 For the same reasons explained in the Cornell Report,193 it is my
opinion that Professor Hubbard’s failure to normalize both the historical and FY
2014 EBITDA projections further understated the fair value estimates he generated
from his consolidated trading multiples method.
89.

A sum of the parts analysis is particularly useful in a company such as

Dell which has a complicated mix of segments with different growth rates and
profitability that are expected to change over the forecast period. In the Cornell
Report, I used the growth rates implied by the segment projections to develop PGR
estimates for each segment.194 I then used the consolidated results of SOTP DCF
valuations of the segments to develop an overall consolidated PGR estimate of
2.32%, which I lowered to 1.0% in order to take into account the possibility that
Dell’s transformation strategy would not occur within the time horizon

192
193
194

Cornell Report, ¶ 127 and Exhibit 19.
Cornell Report, ¶¶ 125-126.
Cornell Report, ¶ 99.
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projected.195 It is my opinion that my consideration of the segment growth rates
and resulting SOTP valuations provides independent support for my valuation.
VIII.

E&Y’S ASC 805 DCF VALUATION PROVIDES FURTHER
EVIDENCE OF THE REASONABLENESS OF MY ESTIMATE OF
DELL’S FAIR VALUE PER SHARE
90.

To further corroborate my estimates of Dell’s value, I reviewed the

consolidated DCF analysis in the aforementioned E&Y ASC 805 Valuation as of
October 29, 2013. The projections used in this analysis were obtained from Dell’s
management and appear to represent Dell management’s most recent views on
Dell’s future performance before the transaction closed.196 Unlike the Bank Case
with Cost Savings projections, the forecast period for the E&Y valuation runs
through 2023. Exhibit 14 compares the projections used in E&Y’s DCF valuation
with the Bank Case with Cost Savings projections. Although revenues are higher
in the E&Y projections, EBITDA and free cash flow are lower. The E&Y
projections show a delay of approximately three years in reaching the EBITDA
levels and a delay of one to two years in reaching the free cash flow levels shown
in the Bank Case with Cost Savings.

195
196

Cornell Report, ¶ 100.
Dell Inc. ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young,
DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022.
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91.

E&Y assumes a perpetuity growth rate of 1.2% and a discount rate of

17.6% to arrive at an estimated enterprise value of $21.1 billion.197 However,
when I use my estimate of Dell’s WACC of 9.0%198 while holding all other
assumptions constant, I arrive at an estimated enterprise value of $44.2 billion.
(See Revised Exhibit 15A.) Because the projections used in this valuation include
an imputed charge for the use of Dell’s trade name, I add back E&Y’s estimate of
Dell’s trade name value of $1.435 billion.199 I then adjust the resulting enterprise
value by adding estimated cash and investments of $12.469 billion and deducting
estimated debt of $6.311 billion to arrive at an estimate of Dell’s total equity value
of $51.772 billion.200 I then divide by fully diluted shares outstanding of 1.784
billion to arrive at my estimate of Dell’s equity value per share under this scenario
of $29.02.
92.

If I instead use Professor Hubbard’s estimate of Dell’s WACC of

9.46%, my estimate of Dell’s equity value per share under this scenario would be
$27.62. (See Revised Exhibit 15B.) The fact that both estimates are close to my
197

198
199

200

Dell Inc. ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young,
DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022.
Cornell Report, ¶ 113.
Dell Inc. ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young,
DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022. Given that the composite discount rate used to
value Dell’s trade name across segments is 17.6%, its value would be
significantly higher (close to double) if either my WACC estimate (9.0%) or
Professor Hubbard’s estimate (9.46%) is used.
Cornell Exhibit 11.
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Minor Differences Between WACC Estimates
A.

Cost of Debt

1.

Professor Hubbard and I used a similar approach to estimate Dell’s

cost of debt (i.e., the yield on an index based on long-term publicly traded debt
issued by companies with a similar credit rating as Dell).1 I similarly agree with
Professor Hubbard that the estimate should be based on Dell’s debt rating absent
any impact of the anticipated Buyout Transaction.2 Whereas Professor Hubbard
used the yield as of October 29, 2013 on 15-year bonds with Dell’s ‘A’ rating prior
to the announcement of the Buyout Transaction (4.45%),3 I use a more
conservative (i.e., value reducing) estimate: the yield on long-term bonds that
reflect the downgrade in Dell’s debt rating to ‘BBB’ following the Company’s
release of its results for the first quarter of FY 2014 in early May 2013 (4.95%).4

1
2
3
4

Hubbard Report, ¶ 254; Cornell Report, ¶ 104.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 254; Cornell Report, ¶ 104.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 255.
Cornell Report, ¶ 104; “Dell Inc. Ratings Lowered To ‘BBB’ On Weak
Operating Performance; Ratings Remain on CreditWatch Negative,” S&P
Ratings Direct Research Update, May 20, 2013. I use this rating because the
report specifically references Dell’s weak operating results as the reason for the
downgrade, whereas the report characterizes the proposed Buyout Transaction
as having only a “modest” chance of “materially degrad[ing] Dell’s financial
risk profile,” finding instead that it may result in a future downgrade and thus
justifies S&P’s decision to maintain a CreditWatch with negative implications
on Dell’s rating.
1
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Had Professor Hubbard instead used my 4.95% cost of debt estimate, his
concluded WACC would have been 9.55%. (See Exhibit 12.)
B.

Tax Rate

2.

Professor Hubbard relies on the marginal tax rate of 35.8% identified

in the Shay Report to estimate Dell’s combined statutory rate for purposes of his
calculation of Dell’s after-tax cost of debt.5 Professor Hubbard also calculates the
after-tax amount of Dell’s estimated excess cash using a 35.8% tax rate for
purposes of the cash adjustment factor used in his beta adjustment (discussed
below).6
3.

After considering the Hubbard Report (and his reliance on the Shay

Report), I continue to believe that using Dell management’s 21.0% estimate of its
effective tax rate is the appropriate rate to use in estimating Dell’s WACC. As the
table below shows, my use of a 21.0% tax rate is consistent with the rate used in
many of the valuation analyses contemporaneous to the Appraisal Date.

5

6

As I discuss below, because Professor Hubbard uses an unlevering formula for
calculating his beta estimate that assumes debt has no risk, he does not apply a
tax shield to his unlevering formula as I do. (Hubbard Report, fn. 322 and
Exhibit 16; Cornell Report, Exhibit 6.)
Hubbard Report, Exhibit 15.
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Analysis
Evercore7
J.P. Morgan8
Goldman Sachs9
Houlihan Lokey10

Tax Rate
21.0%
21.0%
20.0%
15.0%

Had Professor Hubbard instead used my 21.0% tax rate, his concluded WACC
would have been 9.63%. (See Exhibit 12.)
C.

Beta

4.

Professor Hubbard and I used similar beta estimates in calculating

Dell’s WACC (1.31 vs. 1.35).11 Professor Hubbard and I agreed that a cash
adjustment factor must be applied in calculating beta and we both used two years
of weekly Bloomberg data, a measurement period from January 14, 2011 through
January 11, 2013, and the S&P500 as the market portfolio.12
5.

We differed, however, in our starting point for estimating Dell’s beta

and in the mechanics of our cash adjustment. Professor Hubbard started with
Dell’s two-year, weekly beta estimate as of January 11, 2013, whereas I obtained
beta estimates for each of my selected peer companies.13 We both then unlevered
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

EVERCORE00004835.xlsm; EVERCORE00051053.xlsm.
JPM_0003324.xlsm; JPM_0119609.xlsm.
GSDELL00000035662.xlsx, “DCF” Tab, Cells L32:Q32.
Dell Inc., Discussion Materials, October 2013.
Hubbard Report, ¶ 245; Cornell Report, ¶ 109.
Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 235-237, 240-243; Cornell Report, ¶¶ 108-109.
As I noted in the Cornell Report, I found it more appropriate to estimate Dell’s
beta based on the median peer company beta than its own historical beta due to
the imprecision inherent in measuring beta using one company’s estimate and
3
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these betas (i.e., removed the impact of the existing capital structure), which
resulted in unlevered beta estimates of 0.83 for Professor Hubbard and 0.94 for me
(based on the median of the unlevered peer company betas).14
6.

I took the median unlevered beta of 0.94 and applied my cash

adjustment (based on the median ratio of cash to firm value for the peer companies
of 12.1%) to calculate a cash-adjusted unlevered peer beta of 1.07.15 I then
relevered the cash-adjusted unlevered median beta using my target capital structure
of 24.75% debt to total capital to arrive at my beta estimate of 1.35.16 Professor
Hubbard instead relevered his beta using his same assumption for Dell’s target
capital structure and thus arrived at the same 1.11 beta he obtained from his
regression.17 Hubbard then applied a cash adjustment factor of 1.18, which is
equivalent to a cash-to-firm value ratio of 15.25% (compared to my 12.1% ratio),

14

15
16
17

since the transformation was expected to make Dell’s operations more similar
to that of its peers by the end of the forecast period (or soon thereafter).
(Cornell Report, ¶ 108.)
Professor Hubbard uses a relevering formula that assumes the debt tax shield
has the same risk as operating assets. (Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 785, Hubbard
Report, Exhibit 16.) I make the more conservative assumption and instead use
a relevering formula that assumes the debt tax shield has the same risk as debt.
(Corporate Valuation, p. 222, Cornell Report, Exhibit 7.) The formula used by
Professor Hubbard assumes that Dell’s debt is risk-free and that its beta is zero.
Dell’s debt carried a low risk of default, but it was not risk-free, which means
that Professor Hubbard’s formula results in measurement error. (See Valuation,
5th Ed., p. 785.)
Cornell Report, Exhibit 6.
Cornell Report, Exhibit 7.
Hubbard Report, Exhibit 16.
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to calculate a cash-adjusted beta of 1.31.18 Had Professor Hubbard instead used
my 1.35 beta estimate, his concluded WACC would have been 9.65%. (See
Exhibit 12.)
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Hubbard Report, Exhibit 16. Professor Hubbard calculates his cash adjustment
factor using an average excess cash amount measured quarterly over the period
from Q4 FY 2011 – Q4 FY 2013. (Hubbard Report, Exhibit 15.) He assumes
that $5 billion of cash is needed in Dell’s operations, so his cash adjustment is
based only on excess cash in each period and, as I discuss above, the excess
cash amount is also calculated on an after-tax basis using his marginal tax rate
of 35.8%.
5

REVISED EXHIBIT 1
Dell Inc.
Impact of Changes to Hubbard's Assumptions

Per Share Impact of Changes in:
Hubbard
Hubbard
Adjusted
Adjusted
BCG Case
Bank Case

#

Adjustment

[1]

As Reported

$12.52

$14.16

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]

Adjustments to Free Cash Flow Projections (Report Section III)
Impact of Updated PC Forecast
Impact of Attachment Rates
Remove reinvestment in second stage
After change in [4]; remove Hubbard's reinvestment amount in terminal period
Include acquisitions in second stage
After change in [5] for BCG Case or [6] for Bank Case; change perpetuity growth rate from 2% to 1%
Change to 25% of $3.3B in cost savings
After change in [8]; grow cost savings at 1% in second stage
Change terminal tax rate from 35.8% to 18.5% (i.e., all tax rates at 18.5%)
After change in [10]; change first stage, second stage, and terminal tax rates from 18.5% to 21% (i.e., all tax rates at 21%)
Change Hubbard's stock based compensation expense to Cornell's stock based compensation expense
Remove Private Company Compensation Plan Expense and Incremental Operating Expense
Other Differences
Section III Subtotal

$1.35
$0.96
$0.44
$1.75
N/A
($1.32)
($0.12)
$0.47
$2.40
($0.58)
($0.39)
N/A
$0.06
$5.04

$0.21
N/A
$0.77
$2.09
($0.64)
($1.25)
N/A
N/A
$2.82
($0.67)
($0.10)
$1.24
$0.58
$5.04

$3.52
N/A
$3.52

N/A
$4.20
$4.20

$2.83
$0.10
$1.71
$1.25
($0.16)
($0.13)
$5.59

$2.83
$0.10
$1.71
$1.27
($0.16)
($0.14)
$5.60

Adjustments to WACC (Report Section VI)
[26] Change WACC from 9.46% to 9.00%

$0.57

$0.75

[27] Total Impact of Individual Adjustments
[28] Impact of Cumulating Adjustments
[29] Cornell's Conclusion (BCG 50% Case: Revised Exhibit 10 and Bank Case: Revised Exhibit 11)

$27.24
$1.67
$28.91

$29.74
($1.43)
$28.31

Adjustments to Include Cost Savings (Report Section IV)
[16] After change in [9]; change to 50% of $3.3B in cost savings and grow at 1% in second stage
[17] Include cost savings of $500M in FY 2015 and $1.0B from FY 2016 to FY 2018 and then grow at 1% in second stage
[18] Section IV Subtotal

[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]

Adjustments to Calculate Equity Value (Report Section V)
Change Cash Balance from $6.040 billion to $11.040 billion
After change in [19]; change from Hubbard's Net Debt to Cornell's Net Debt
Change FIN 48 Liability from $3.010 billion to $0
Change Deferred Tax Liability from $2.199 billion to $0
Change Net Operating Loss Deferred Asset from $278 million to $0
Change from Hubbard's shares outstanding to Cornell's shares outstanding
Section V Subtotal

See notes on following page.

REVISED EXHIBIT 1
Dell Inc.
Impact of Changes to Hubbard's Assumptions

[14]: Includes adjustments for the differences in depreciation, working capital, capital expenditure, Q4 2013 stub period, and after tax restructuring. For the BCG Case the difference in
depreciation is $0.15, working capital is $0.20, capital expenditure is ($0.23), and Q4 2013 stub period is ($0.05). For the Bank Case the difference in depreciation is $0.00, working
capital is $0.31, capital expenditure is $0.00, Q4 2013 stub period is ($0.04), and after tax restructuring is $0.30. The sum of these amounts differs from the $0.06 per share (Hubbard
Adjusted BCG 25% Case) and $0.58 per share (Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case) listed under adjustment [14] due to rounding.
[15] = Sum [2]:[14]
[18] = Sum [16]:[17]
[25] = Sum [19]:[24]
[27] = [15] + [18] + [25] + [26]
[28] = [29] - [27]

EXHIBIT 2A
Dell Inc.
Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate as of FY 2017 using Hubbard Adjusted BCG DCF Model
($ in millions)

#

Q4 2014

FY 2015

FY 2016

FY 2017

FY 2018

FY 2019

FY 2020

FY 2021

FY 2022

Terminal
Value

$682.5

$2,611.6

$2,673.9

$2,319.0

$2,565.6

$2,468.4

$2,399.3

$2,355.9

$2,337.9

$1,734.6

0.934
$2,440.5

0.854
$2,282.7

0.780
$1,808.7

0.713
$1,828.0

0.651
$1,606.8

0.595
$1,426.8

0.543
$1,279.9

0.496
$1,160.4

$23,252.2
0.496
$11,540.7

[1]

Free Cash Flow (FCF)

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

Terminal Value
Discount Factor
Discounted Free Cash Flow
Enterprise Value

0.989
$674.8
$26,049.3

[6]
[7]
[8]

FY 2018 to Terminal Value
FY 2017 Discount Factor
Future Value of Terminal Value

$18,842.7
0.780
$24,159.9

[9] FY 2017 Free Cash Flow
[10] Discount Rate
[11] Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate
[1]:
[2]:
[3]:
[4]:
[5]:
[6]:
[7]:
[8]
[9]:
[10]:
[11]

$2,319.0
9.46%
-0.13%

Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 18.
Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 18.
Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 18.
Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 18.
= Sum Line [4]
= Sum Line [4] from FY 2018 to Terminal Value
= Line [3] for FY 2017
= [6] / [7]
= Line [1] for FY 2017
Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 16.
= (( [8] * [10] ) - [9] ) / ( [8] + [9] )

EXHIBIT 2B
Dell Inc.
Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate as of FY 2018 using Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case DCF Model
($ in millions)

#

Q4 2014

FY 2015

FY 2016

FY 2017

FY 2018

FY 2019

FY 2020

FY 2021

FY 2022

FY 2023

Terminal
Value

$613.8

$1,528.2

$1,934.5

$2,276.7

$2,527.7

$2,777.0

$2,863.0

$2,936.9

$2,997.4

$3,043.2

$2,260.0

0.934
$1,428.1

0.854
$1,651.5

0.780
$1,775.6

0.713
$1,801.0

0.651
$1,807.7

0.595
$1,702.6

0.543
$1,595.6

0.496
$1,487.7

0.453
$1,379.9

$30,294.5
0.453
$13,736.6

[1]

Free Cash Flow (FCF)

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

Terminal Value
Discount Factor
Discounted Free Cash Flow
Enterprise Value

0.989
$606.9
$28,973.1

[6]
[7]
[8]

FY 2019 to Terminal Value
FY 2018 Discount Factor
Future Value of Terminal Value

$21,710.0
0.713
$30,469.6

[9] FY 2018 Free Cash Flow
[10] Discount Rate
[11] Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate
[1]:
[2]:
[3]:
[4]:
[5]:
[6]:
[7]:
[8]
[9]:
[10]:
[11]

$2,527.7
9.46%
1.08%

Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 24.
Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 24.
Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 24.
Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 24.
= Sum Line [4]
= Sum Line [4] from FY 2019 to Terminal Value
= Line [3] for FY 2018
= [6] / [7]
= Line [1] for FY 2018
Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 16.
= (( [8] * [10] ) - [9] ) / ( [8] + [9] )

EXHIBIT 3A
Dell Inc.
Terminal Period Annual Reinvestment Amount for Cornell Bank Case with Cost Savings Projections
($ in millions)

#

[1]
[2]
[3]

Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, and Amortization (EBITA)
Add: Stock Based Compensation (Option Expense)
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Amortization, and Option Expense (EBITAO)

[4]

Tax Rate

[5]
[6]
[7]

Earnings Before Interest, Amortization, and Option Expense (EBIAO)
Less: After-tax SBC
Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPLAT)

[8]
[9]

Perpetuity Growth Rate (g)
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)

[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]

Required Investment in Following Year (Except Terminal Period)
Less; Acquisitions
Less: Annual Increase in Net Working Capital
Net Investment Amount

[14]

Lump-Sum Investment Needed for 1% Perpetuity Growth in Terminal Period

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015

FY2016

FY2017

FY2018

$4,274
347
$4,621

$2,731
362
$3,093

$3,648
362
$4,010

$4,526
362
$4,888

$4,898
362
$5,260

$5,135
362
$5,497

21.0%
$3,651
274
$3,376

21.0%
$2,443
286
$2,157

21.0%
$3,168
286
$2,882

21.0%
$3,862
286
$3,576

21.0%
$4,155
286
$3,869

Total
(FY2013-18)

Terminal

21.0%
$4,343
286
$4,057

1.00%
9.00%

1.00%
9.00%

1.00%
9.00%

1.00%
9.00%

1.00%
9.00%

1.00%
9.00%

$375
($4,844)
($614)
($5,083)

$240
($400)
$470
$310

$320
($400)
($182)
($262)

$397
($400)
($115)
($117)

$430
($400)
($71)
($41)

$451
($400)
($15)
$36

1.00%
9.00%
$2,213
(6,844)
(527)
($5,158)

$451
(400)
(15)
$36
$451

Notes & Sources: Lump-sum investment amount calculated using Gordon Growth Model assuming that annual reinvestment amount grows at target perpetuity rate: $451 million Lump-sum Investment Amount = $36
million incremental required annual investment / (9.0% ROIC - 1.0% g). Formula for reinvestment amount from Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 110.
[1]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 5A. FY2013 EBITA figure per Dell Inc. FY2013 10-K, p. 65.
[2]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. FY2013 SBC figure per Dell Inc. FY2013 10-K, p. 65.
[3] = [1] + [2].
[4]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[5] = [3] * ( [1] - [4] ).
[6] = [2] * ( [1] - [4] ).
[7] = [5] - [6].
[8]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[9]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[10] = [7] * [8] / [9].
[11]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. FY2013 acquisitions per Dell Inc. FY2013 10-K, p. 65.
[12]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. FY2013 figure from DELLE00734152.xls., tab: Consolidated.
[13] = SUM( [10] : [12] ).
[14] = Terminal [14] / ( [9] - [8] ).

EXHIBIT 3B
Dell Inc.
Terminal Period Annual Reinvestment Amount for Cornell BCG 50% Case Projections
($ in millions)

#

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015

FY2016

FY2017

[1]
[2]
[3]

Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, and Amortization (EBITA)
Add: Stock Based Compensation (Option Expense)
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Amortization, and Option Expense (EBITAO)

$3,851
362
$4,213

$3,526
362
$3,888

$4,120
362
$4,482

$4,849
362
$5,211

$4,658
362
$5,020

[4]

Tax Rate

21.0%

21.0%

21.0%

21.0%

21.0%

[5]
[6]
[7]

Earnings Before Interest, Amortization, and Option Expense (EBIAO)
Less: After-tax SBC
Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPLAT)

$3,328
286
$3,042

$3,071
286
$2,785

$3,541
286
$3,255

$4,116
286
$3,830

$3,966
286
$3,680

[8]
[9]

Perpetuity Growth Rate (g)
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)

1.00%
9.00%

1.00%
9.00%

1.00%
9.00%

1.00%
9.00%

1.00%
9.00%

[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]

Required Investment in Following Year (Except Terminal Period)
Less: Acquisitions
Less: Annual Increase in Net Working Capital
Net Investment Amount

$338
(4,950)
($1,355)
($5,967)

$309
($561)
($252)

$362
($599)
($238)

$426
($439)
($13)

$409
$6
$415

[14]

Lump-Sum Investment Needed for 1% Perpetuity Growth in Terminal Period

Total
(FY2013-17)

Terminal

1.00%
9.00%
$1,844
(4,950)
(2,948)
($6,055)

$409
$6
$415

$5,188

Note: Lump-sum investment amount calculated using Gordon Growth Model assuming that annual reinvestment amount grows at target perpetuity rate. $5.188 billion Lump-sum Investment Amount = $415
million incremental required annual investment / (9.0% ROIC - 1.0% g). Formula for reinvestment amount from Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 110.
[1]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 1E.
[2]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 1E.
[3] = [1] + [2].
[4]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[5] = [3] *( [1] - [4] ).
[6] = [2] *( [1] - [4] ).
[7] = [5] - [6].
[8]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[9]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[10] = [7] * [8] / [9].
[11]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 1E.
[12]: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 1E.
[13] = SUM( [10] : [12] ).
[14] = Terminal [14] / ( [9] - [8]).

EXHIBIT 4
Dell Inc.
Summary of Adjustments to DCF Analyses

#

Analysis

Adjust
Adjust
Projections for Projections for
Adjust
Updated PC
Updated
Projections for
Industry
Attachment
Additional
Forecasts
Rates
Investments

Use "Second
Stage"
Transition
Period

Offset for
Use Statutory
Deferred
Tax Rate in Offset for Foreign
Terminal
FIN 48
Tax
Period
Liability Liability

[1]

J.P. Morgan 2/8/2013

See note

[2]
[3]

J.P. Morgan 8/2/2013
Evercore 2/6/2013

See note

[4]

Evercore 8/2/2013

See note

[5]

Boston Consulting Group

X

[6]
[7]

Morgan Stanley
Citi Investment Research

X
X

[8]
[9]

Brean Capital 3/25/13
Morningstar

X

[10] Houlihan Lokey October 2013
[11] Houlihan Lokey 1/31/14
[12] E&Y ASC 805

[13] Hubbard Report
Notes and Sources on following page

See note

X

X

X

X

X

Add-on for
Net
Operating
Loss
Add-on for
Deferred
Excess
Assets
Cash

X

See note
See note
See note

See note
See note

X

X

See note

X

X

Tax Rates Used in DCF

21.0% except for 35.0% in Terminal
Year for 3-year Street and 6-year
Management Cases and Not Used in
Fairness Opinion.
21.0%
21.0% except 35.0% Tax on
Repatriated Cash in Sensitivity Cases
Not Used in Fairness Opinion
21.0% except 35.0% Tax on
Repatriated Cash in Sensitivity Cases
Not Used in Fairness Opinion
FY2013: 21.9%
FY2014-2015: 22.2%
FY2016: 22.3%
FY2017: 22.4%
FY2018-2027: 20.0%
21.0%
FY 2013: 17.5% - 22.5%
FY 2014 and beyond: 21%
Imputed 22.2%
Long-run tax rates
5/24/12: 22.4%
12/22/12 - 8/19/13: 25.0%
15.0%
17.0%
Maximum Effective Tax Rates
Consolidated: 15.0%
EUC: 10.0%
ESG: 20.0%
Services - Support: 10.0%
Services - Other: 30.0%
Software: 25.0%
FY2014-22: 18.5%
Terminal: 35.8%

EXHIBIT 4
Dell Inc.
Summary of Adjustments to DCF Analyses

#

Analysis

Adjust
Adjust
Projections for Projections for
Adjust
Updated PC
Updated
Projections for
Industry
Attachment
Additional
Forecasts
Rates
Investments

Use "Second
Stage"
Transition
Period

Offset for
Use Statutory
Deferred
Tax Rate in Offset for Foreign
Terminal
FIN 48
Tax
Period
Liability Liability

Add-on for
Net
Operating
Loss
Add-on for
Deferred
Excess
Assets
Cash

Tax Rates Used in DCF

Notes & Sources:
[1] JPM_0003324.xlsm JPM performed sensitivity analyses assuming repatriation of cash with a 35% tax rate for the terminal period on the 3-year street and 6-year management case analyses that used perpetuity
growth rates but did not use these values in its fairness opinion.
[2] JPM_0119609.xlsm
[3] EVERCORE00004835.xlsm Evercore performed sensitivity analyses assuming repatriation of cash with a 35% effective tax rate but did not use these values in its fairness opinion.
[4] EVERCORE00051053.xlsm Evercore performed sensitivity analyses assuming repatriation of cash with a 35% effective tax rate but did not use these values in its fairness opinion.
[5] BCG00013575.xlsx (Ning Exhibit 18)
[6] SLP_DELLAP00015608. See Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 140.
[7] SLP_DELLAP00038457. See Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 140. Citi took working capital requirements out of cash balance instead of treating them as cash flows.
[8] Brean Capital, LLC, Dell, Inc., "Bidding Could Be On With $15 Offer," March 25, 2013
[9] Morningstar, "Dell Inc.," Reports from May 24, 2012, December 22, 2012, March 1, 2013, May 21, 2013, and August 19, 2013. There is an offset for "other adjustments" without any details given. As of August
19, 2013, these adjustments totaled $163 million. (p. 15).
[10] Dell Inc., Discussion Materials, October 2013. Includes Dell's estimate of tax and legal liabilities between $800 and $850 million (DELLE00779987-052, at 000).
[11] Denali Holding, Inc., Valuation Analysis as of January 31, 2014. Includes Dell's estimate of tax and legal liabilities between $835 and $865 million (DELLE00735405-430, at 407)
[12] Dell Inc ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, DELLE00733762-4129 at 022-027. Makes non-standard adjustments to DCF value to arrive at Total Invested Capital
(DELLE00734117).
[13] Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, pp. 69-146. Hubbard Exhibits 18 - 26.

EXHIBIT 5
Dell Inc.
Effective Tax Rate
FY 1989 to FY 2013
40%

35%

30%
Average Last 25 Years: 1989 to 2013: 28.1%

Effective Tax Rate

25%

Average Last 10 Years: 2004 to 2013: 23.8%

20%

Average Last 3 Years: 2011 to 2013: 18.5%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Source: Capital IQ.

EXHIBIT 6
Dell Inc.
Common Dividends Paid, Share Repurchases and Acquisitions
($ in millions)

Year

Common Stock Dividends

Share Repurchases

Acquisitions

FY2000
FY2001
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013

$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
($278)

($1,061)
($2,700)
($3,000)
($2,290)
($2,000)
($4,219)
($7,249)
($3,026)
($4,004)
($2,867)
$0
($800)
($2,717)
($724)

$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
($118)
($2,217)
($176)
($3,613)
($376)
($2,562)
($4,844)

Total

($278)

($36,657)

($13,906)

Note: $172 million acquisition figure excluded in 2004 because figure represents cash assumed in consolidation of
Dell Financial Services L.P.
Sources: Capital IQ; Dell, Inc. 2004 Form 10-K, p. 33.

EXHIBIT 7
Dell Inc.
Comparison of Historical Margins to Bank Case Projections

#

Line Item

2009A

2010A

2011A

Corporate General & Administrative Expense as a % of Revenue
[1] Historical
11.40%
12.22%
11.87%
[2] Bank Case
[3] Bank Case with Cost Savings
EBITDA Margin
[4] Historical
[5] Bank Case
[6] Bank Case with Cost Savings

6.94%

6.16%

7.25%

2012A

2013A

13.73%

14.23%

8.73%

2014E

2015E

2016E

2017E

2018E

13.12%
13.12%

13.02%
13.53%

12.93%
13.92%

12.82%
13.79%

12.75%
13.70%

5.71%
5.71%

6.38%
7.23%

6.85%
8.51%

7.25%
8.86%

7.50%
9.08%

7.42%

Notes & Sources: EBITDA = Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization. Bank Case Corporate G&A calculated as Total Operating Expense less
R&D expense per Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. Bank Case with Cost Savings Bank Case Corporate G&A calculated as Total Operating
Expense less R&D expense, and including bank case cost savings per Durban Exhibit 19 (Project Denali, September 2013), p. 82 (DELLE00239046-48).
[1] , [4] : Capital IQ.
[2] , [5] : Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2.
[3] , [6] : Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. Breakdown of cost savings, where 60% of planned savings are in operating expenses, from Durban
Exhibit 19 (Project Denali, September 2013), p. 82 (DELLE00239046-48).

EXHIBIT 8
Dell Inc.
Comparison of Projections for Net Working Capital Investment and Total Net Reinvestment
2014-2018
($ in millions)
2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Revenues
9/21 Management Case
% Growth

$59,933
4.25%

$63,232
5.51%

$66,567
5.27%

$68,019
2.18%

$69,562
2.27%

BCG Base Case
% Growth

$56,448
(0.70%)

$55,511
(1.66%)

$55,050
(0.83%)

$54,339
(1.29%)

$53,398
(1.73%)

Bank Case
% Growth

$57,200
0.46%

$58,713
2.65%

$60,240
2.60%

$62,031
2.97%

$63,154
1.81%

Net Working Capital (NWC) Investment
9/21 Management Case
($1,208)
% of Revenue
2.02%

($884)
1.40%

($694)
1.04%

($153)
0.22%

($144)
0.21%

BCG Base Case
% of Revenue

($247)
0.44%

($398)
0.72%

($217)
0.39%

($462)
0.85%

($91)
0.17%

Bank Case
% of Revenue

$470
(0.82%)

($182)
0.31%

($115)
0.19%

($71)
0.11%

($15)
0.02%

Capital Expenditures (CapEx)
9/21 Management Case
% of Revenue

($600)
1.00%

($600)
0.95%

($600)
0.90%

($600)
0.88%

($600)
0.86%

BCG Base Case
% of Revenue

($600)
1.06%

($600)
1.08%

($600)
1.09%

($600)
1.10%

($590)
1.10%

Bank Case
% of Revenue

($552)
0.97%

($600)
1.02%

($600)
1.00%

($600)
0.97%

($600)
0.95%

EXHIBIT 8
Dell Inc.
Comparison of Projections for Net Working Capital Investment and Total Net Reinvestment
2014-2018
($ in millions)
2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

($1,100)
1.84%

$0
0.00%

$0
0.00%

$0
0.00%

$0
0.00%

BCG Base Case
% of Revenue

$0
0.00%

$0
0.00%

$0
0.00%

$0
0.00%

$0
0.00%

Bank Case
% of Revenue

($472)
0.83%

($400)
0.68%

($400)
0.66%

($400)
0.64%

($400)
0.63%

Depreciation and Amortization (D&A)
9/21 Management Case
$586
% of Revenue
0.98%

$586
0.93%

$586
0.88%

$586
0.86%

$586
0.84%

BCG Base Case
% of Revenue

$586
1.04%

$586
1.05%

$586
1.06%

$586
1.08%

$586
1.10%

Bank Case
% of Revenue

$538
0.94%

$600
1.02%

$600
1.00%

$600
0.97%

$600
0.95%

Total Net Reinvestment (NWC + CapEx + Acquisitions - D&A )
9/21 Management Case
($3,494)
($2,070)
% of Revenue
5.83%
3.27%

($1,880)
2.82%

($1,338)
1.97%

($1,330)
1.91%

BCG Base Case
% of Revenue

($1,433)
2.54%

($1,584)
2.85%

($1,403)
2.55%

($1,648)
3.03%

($1,266)
2.37%

Bank Case
% of Revenue

($1,092)
1.91%

($1,782)
3.04%

($1,715)
2.85%

($1,671)
2.69%

($1,615)
2.56%

Acquisitions
9/21 Management Case
% of Revenue

Sources: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Appendix F and Exhibits 1A, 2.

EXHIBIT 9
Dell, Inc.
Comparison of EBITDA Margins in BCG and Bank Cases
9.87%

10.00%

9.65%
8.86%

8.48%

8.35%

8.51%
8.11%

8.00%

7.72%
7.28%

7.25%

7.23%

7.13%

6.85%
6.38%
6.00%

5.71% 5.71%

4.00%

2.00%

0.00%
2014E

2015E
BCG 50% Forecast

BCG 25% Forecast

Source: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibits 1C, 1E, and 2.

2016E
Bank Case w/ Cost Savings

2017E
Bank Case

REVISED EXHIBIT 10
Dell Inc.
Adjustments to Hubbard Net Cash as of October 29, 2013
($ in millions)

#

Item

[1]
[2]
[3] = [1] + [2]

Excess Cash per Hubbard
Add: Operating Cash per Hubbard
Total Cash per Hubbard

$6,040
$5,000
$11,040

[4]
[5]
[6]

Total Transaction-Related Cash Expenditures Paid Between 2/2/13 - 10/28/13
Add: Transaction-Related Debt Repayments 8/2/13 - 10/28/13
Less: Transaction Related Proceeds from Debt 8/2/13/ - 10/28/13

$172
$1,506
($249)
$12,469

[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] = [7] + [8] + [9]

Debt per Hubbard
Transaction-Related Debt Repayments 8/2/13 - 10/28/13
Less: Transaction Related Proceeds from Debt 8/2/13/ - 10/28/13
Adjusted Debt

$5,054
$1,506
($249)
$6,311

[11] = [6] - [10]

Adjusted Net Cash

$6,158

Sources:
[1] - [2], [7]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 134.
[4] - [5], [8] -[9]: Cornell Report, Appendix G.

Amount

EXHIBIT 11
Dell Inc.
Professor Hubbard's Implicit Average Taxes Assuming Payment of Deferred Taxes Over
25-Year Period
($ in Millions)

#

Fiscal Year

EBITAO
[A]

Current
Tax Payment
[B] = [A] * 35.8%

Deferred
Tax Payment
[C] = $11,699 / 25

Total
Tax Payment
[D] = [B] + [C]

Effective
Tax Rate
[E] = [D] / [A]

2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047

$3,811
$3,887
$3,964
$4,044
$4,125
$4,207
$4,291
$4,377
$4,465
$4,554
$4,645
$4,738
$4,833
$4,929
$5,028
$5,128
$5,231
$5,336
$5,442
$5,551
$5,662
$5,775
$5,891
$6,009
$6,129

$1,364
$1,391
$1,419
$1,448
$1,477
$1,506
$1,536
$1,567
$1,598
$1,630
$1,663
$1,696
$1,730
$1,765
$1,800
$1,836
$1,873
$1,910
$1,948
$1,987
$2,027
$2,068
$2,109
$2,151
$2,194

$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468
$468

$1,832
$1,859
$1,887
$1,916
$1,945
$1,974
$2,004
$2,035
$2,066
$2,098
$2,131
$2,164
$2,198
$2,233
$2,268
$2,304
$2,341
$2,378
$2,416
$2,455
$2,495
$2,536
$2,577
$2,619
$2,662

48.08%
47.84%
47.60%
47.37%
47.15%
46.92%
46.70%
46.49%
46.28%
46.08%
45.87%
45.68%
45.48%
45.29%
45.11%
44.92%
44.75%
44.57%
44.40%
44.23%
44.06%
43.90%
43.74%
43.59%
43.44%

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
Average

Notes:
1) Terminal period starts in FY2023. EBITAO assumed to grow at Hubbard 2% annual perpetuity growth rate.
2) Current Tax Payment at 35.8% statutory tax rate.
3) Deferred Tax Payment based on 25-year straight line repayment of $11.699 billion in deferred taxes.
Source: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibits 18 and 23.

45.58%

EXHIBIT 12
Dell Inc.
WACC Inputs

Line Item

Hubbard

Cornell
ERP

Hubbard Adjusted to Use
Cornell
Cornell
Cost of Debt Tax Rate

Cornell
Beta

Cost of Equity:
Risk Free Rate
Equity Risk Premium
Unlevered Adjusted Beta
Cash/Firm Value Ratio
Cash Adjustment Factor
Hubbard Relevered Beta
Cornell Cash Unlevered Beta
Assumed Dell D/E
Tax Rate
Hubbard Cash Adjusted Relevered Beta
Cornell Relevered Cash + Market Adjusted Beta
Cost of Equity
Equity Weight

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[4]
[5] = [3] * ( 1+ [6] )
[6] = [3] * [4]
[7] = ( 1 - [12] ) / [12]
[8]
[9] = [4] * [5]
[10] = [6] * ( (1 + (1 - [8]) * [7] )
[11] = [1] + [2] * [10]
[12]

3.31%
6.41%
0.83
15.25%
1.18
1.11

3.31%
5.50%
0.83
15.25%
1.18
1.11

3.31%
6.41%
0.83
15.25%
1.18
1.11

3.31%
6.41%
0.83
15.25%
1.18
1.11

33.78%
35.80%
1.31

33.78%
18.50%
1.31

33.78%
18.50%
1.31

33.78%
21.00%
1.31

11.70%
74.75%

10.52%
74.75%

11.70%
74.75%

11.70%
74.75%

1.35
11.94%
74.75%

Cost of Debt:
Pre Tax Cost of Debt
Tax Rate
After Tax Cost of Debt
Debt Weight

[13]
[14] = [8]
[15] = [13] * ( 1 - [14] )
[16] = 1 - [12]

4.45%
35.80%
2.86%
25.25%

4.45%
35.80%
2.86%
25.25%

4.95%
35.80%
3.18%
25.25%

4.45%
21.00%
3.52%
25.25%

4.45%
35.80%
2.86%
25.25%

WACC

[17] = [11] * [12] + [15] * [16]

9.47%

8.58%

9.55%

9.63%

9.65%

Sources: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 7. Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 16.

3.31%
6.41%

EXHIBIT 13
Dell Inc.
Summary of Sum-of-the-Parts Valuations
2011-2013

#

Party

Valuation Date
Published Date
As of Date

Segments

Adjustments

Value Conclusion

[1] Dell

1/17/2011

1/14/2011

1) Consumer
2) Small & Medium Business
3) Large Enterprise & Public

$27.05/share

[2] Dell

7/12/2012

12/31/2012

1) EUC
2) ESG
3) Services
4) S&P
5) Software

$40 billion

[3] Jefferies

1/15/2013

1/15/2013

1) PCs
2) Software and Peripherals
3) Servers and Networking
4) Enhanced Services (Perot and PC Services)
5) Storage

$13.00/share

[4] Icahn/Southeastern

2/8/2013

2/8/2013

1) Dell Financial Services (DFS)
2) Server Business
3) Support and Deployment
4) PC Business
5) Software and Peripherals

[5] Brean Capital

2/14/2013

2/14/2013

1) Desktop
2) Mobility
3) Servers & Networking
4) Storage
5) Services
6) Software & Peripherals

$13.20 (based on P/E multiple)
$19.90 (based on EV/EBITDA multiple)
$16.60 (blended)

[6] Brean Capital

3/25/2013

3/25/2013

1) Desktop
2) Mobility
3) Servers & Networking
4) Storage
5) Services
6) Software & Peripherals

$13.20 (based on P/E multiple)
$19.90 (based on EV/EBITDA multiple)
$16.60 (blended)

[7] JP Morgan

N/A

Notes & Sources (on following page):

1st Quarter of 1) EUC
Fiscal Year 2) ESG
2014
3) Services
4) Software
5) Unallocated Corporate

SOTP analysis also includes value of net cash,
acquisitions since 2008, unallocated expenses,
and DFS value embedded in segments.

$23.72/share

SOTP Analysis also includes value of net cash. $12.15-$14.74/share
$21.7 billion-$26.4 billion for Implied Value

EXHIBIT 13
Dell Inc.
Summary of Sum-of-the-Parts Valuations
2011-2013
Notes:
1. As of date is assumed to be the same as published date if not stated.
2. $40 billion Enterprise Value as of 2012 Year End was estimated by Dell on July 12, 2012. See Gladden Exhibit 9, p. 16 (DELL00017564).
Sources:
[1] Dell Investor Relations, Dell Sum of the Parts Analysis, January 17, 2011 (Gladden Exhibit 2), p. 5.
[2] Board of Directors Meeting, Financial Framework, July 12, 2012, Brian Gladden Presentation (Gladden Exhibit 9), p. 16 (DELL00017564).
[3] Jefferies, "LBO Is a Possibility; Raise Target to $13," January 13, 2013, p. 3.
[4] Dell Inc. Schedule 13D, February 8, 2013, pp. 2-3.
[5] Brean Capital, "Dell/HP Previews - Moving Dell to Hold, 'Tho We Agree LBO Undervalues Cash Flow," February 14, 2013, p. 4.
[6] Brean Capital, "Bidding Could Be On With $15 Offer," March 25, 2013, p. 4.
[7] Ex 30 2 of 2 (JPM_0018648).pdf, p. 0 (JPM_0018648).

EXHIBIT 14
Dell Inc.
Comparison of Bank Case with Cost Savings and E&Y Projections
2015-2023
($ in millions)

Revenue
Bank Case w/ Cost Savings
% Growth
E&Y Case
% Growth
EBITDA
Bank Case w/ Cost Savings
% Growth
EBITDA Margin
E&Y Case
% Growth
EBITDA Margin
Free Cash Flow
Bank Case w/ Cost Savings
% Growth
E&Y Case
% Growth

2015

2016

2017

2018

$58,713

$60,240
2.60%

$62,031
2.97%

$63,154
1.81%

$60,148

$61,717
2.61%

$63,583
3.02%

$64,837
1.97%

$4,248

$5,126
20.69%
8.51%

$5,498
7.25%
8.86%

$5,735
4.32%
9.08%

$3,770
12.65%
6.11%

$4,170
10.63%
6.56%

$4,487
7.60%
6.92%

$2,299

$3,061
33.13%

$3,398
11.01%

$3,642
7.19%

$2,396

$2,755
14.97%

$3,060
11.09%

$3,317
8.40%

7.23%
$3,347
5.56%

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

$65,915
1.66%

$66,926
1.53%

$67,845
1.37%

$68,726
1.30%

$69,551
1.20%

$4,743
5.70%
7.20%

$4,949
4.35%
7.40%

$5,129
3.63%
7.56%

$5,255
2.46%
7.65%

$5,376
2.29%
7.73%

$3,533
6.50%

$3,685
4.30%

$3,823
3.75%

$3,919
2.52%

$4,016
2.47%

Note: EBITDA = Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization.
Sources: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11. Dell Inc. ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young,
DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022.

REVISED EXHIBIT 15A
Dell Inc.
E&Y ASC 805 Valuation Analysis
Consolidated Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
As of October 29, 2013
($ in millions, except Per Share Values)

#
LTM

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]

Total Revenue
Cost of Goods Sold
Gross Profit
Operating Expenses
Sales and Marketing
Research and Development
General and Administrative
Total Operating Expenses
EBIT
DFS Operating Interest Expense
Charge for use of the Dell Trade Name
Adjusted EBIT
Income Tax Expense
Debt-free Net Earnings
Add: Depreciation Expense
Add/(Less): Changes in DFNWC
Less: Capital Expenditures
Debt-free Cash Flow Available for Distribution
Discounting Convention
Present Value Factor at 9.0% (Cornell WACC Estimate)
Present Value - Debt-free Cash Flow

[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]

Sum of Present Values - Detailed Periods
Add: Present Value - Terminal Year
Present Value of Operations
Add: Dell Trade Name
Add: Cornell Cash and Investments
Less: Cornell Total Debt
Total Equity Value
Shares Outstanding
Implied Equity Value per Share

Notes & Sources (on following page):

$ 56,977,861

Remaining
3 Months
2014

2015

2016

2017

$ 15,130,275
12,094,588
$ 3,035,687

$ 60,148,170
47,807,568
$ 12,340,602

$ 61,717,248
48,814,609
$ 12,902,639

$ 63,583,124
50,085,617
$ 13,497,507

$ 64,836,918
50,878,419
$ 13,958,499

$ 65,914,632
51,604,731
$ 14,309,901

$ 1,311,664
320,097
575,284
$ 2,207,045
$
828,642
20,927
72,921
$
734,794
95,599
$
639,195
140,000
14,775
(115,000)
$
678,970
0.13
0.9890
$
671,477

$ 5,547,561
1,306,433
2,367,116
$ 9,221,110
$ 3,119,492
82,630
290,356
$ 2,746,506
340,756
$ 2,405,750
600,000
(9,742)
(600,000)
$ 2,396,008
0.76
0.9368
$ 2,244,587

$ 5,624,487
1,339,501
2,386,567
$ 9,350,555
$ 3,552,084
84,342
297,969
$ 3,169,773
386,588
$ 2,783,185
600,000
(28,608)
(600,000)
$ 2,754,577
1.76
0.8595
$ 2,367,427

$ 5,738,887
1,374,879
2,419,775
$ 9,533,541
$ 3,963,966
86,585
306,947
$ 3,570,434
480,545
$ 3,089,889
600,000
(29,738)
(600,000)
$ 3,060,151
2.76
0.7885
$ 2,412,893

$ 5,817,092
1,409,821
2,443,351
$ 9,670,264
$ 4,288,235
87,835
312,971
$ 3,887,429
535,156
$ 3,352,273
600,000
(35,132)
(600,000)
$ 3,317,141
3.76
0.7234
$ 2,399,565

$ 5,926,380
1,402,965
2,442,547
$ 9,771,892
$ 4,538,009
88,879
318,175
$ 4,130,955
584,784
$ 3,546,171
612,107
(13,274)
(612,103)
$ 3,532,901
4.76
0.6637
$ 2,344,626

$ 20,716,189
23,462,398
$ 44,178,587
1,435,000
12,469,000
(6,311,000)
$ 51,771,587
1,783,913
$
29.02

For the Twelve Month Periods Ending January 31
2018
2019
2020

2021

2022

2023

$ 66,925,554
52,296,211
$ 14,629,343

$ 67,845,259
52,951,281
$ 14,893,978

$ 68,726,445
53,575,822
$ 15,150,623

$ 69,550,586
54,157,882
$ 15,392,704

$ 6,022,343
1,387,156
2,481,089
$ 9,890,588
$ 4,738,755
89,862
323,059
$ 4,325,834
625,828
$ 3,700,006
623,370
(15,167)
(623,363)
$ 3,684,846
5.76
0.6089
$ 2,243,546

$ 6,103,334
1,362,065
2,515,151
$ 9,980,550
$ 4,913,428
90,762
327,502
$ 4,495,164
660,071
$ 3,835,093
633,556
(12,168)
(633,546)
$ 3,822,935
6.76
0.5586
$ 2,135,434

$ 6,203,890
1,356,600
2,554,095
$ 10,114,585
$ 5,036,038
91,626
332,565
$ 4,611,847
681,799
$ 3,930,048
643,271
(10,879)
(643,260)
$ 3,919,180
7.76
0.5125
$ 2,008,435

$ 6,299,879
1,347,553
2,591,364
$ 10,238,796
$ 5,153,908
92,437
338,168
$ 4,723,303
703,048
$ 4,020,255
652,360
(4,101)
(652,349)
$ 4,016,165
8.76
0.4701
$ 1,888,199

[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]

Normalized Debt-Free Cash Flow
EBITDA
Less: Depreciation (Normalized)
Adjusted EBIT
Income Tax Expense
Debt-Free Net Earnings
Add: Depreciation (Normalized)
Add/(Less): Changes in DFNWC
Less: Capital Expenditures
Debt-free Cash Flow Available for Distribution

Data
$ 5,375,663
(652,349)
$ 4,723,314
703,048
$ 4,020,266
652,349
(4,101)
(652,349)
$ 4,016,165

[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]

Constant Growth Model
Debt-free Cash Flow (Normalized)
Terminal Year Growth Rate
Debt-Free Cash Flow, Year Ahead
Divided by: Capitalization Rate
Capitalized Value at End of Estimation Period
Discount Period
Present Value Factor at 9.0% (Cornell WACC Estimate)
Present Value of Terminal Year

Data
$ 4,016,165
1.2%
$ 4,064,327
7.8%
$ 52,101,411
9.26
0.4503
$ 23,462,398

REVISED EXHIBIT 15A
Dell Inc.
E&Y ASC 805 Valuation Analysis
Consolidated Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
As of October 29, 2013
($ in millions, except Per Share Values)
Sources: Cash Flow Projections and Terminal Year Growth Rate [1] - [19], [41] -- Dell Inc ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022. Dell Trade Name Value [25] -- Dell Inc ASC 805
Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, DELLE00733762-4129 at 4117. WACC Estimate [20] per Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, p. 71. Cash and Investments and Total Debt [26] - [27] per Expert Report
of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Revised Exhibit 11.

REVISED EXHIBIT 15B
Dell Inc.
E&Y ASC 805 Valuation Analysis
Consolidated Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
As of October 29, 2013
($ in millions, except Per Share Values)

#
LTM

Remaining
3 Months
2014

2015

2016

2017

For the Twelve Month Periods Ending January 31
2018
2019
2020

2021

2022

2023

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]

Total Revenue
$ 56,977,861
Cost of Goods Sold
Gross Profit
Operating Expenses
Sales and Marketing
Research and Development
General and Administrative
Total Operating Expenses
EBIT
DFS Operating Interest Expense
Charge for use of the Dell Trade Name
Adjusted EBIT
Income Tax Expense
Debt-free Net Earnings
Add: Depreciation Expense
Add/(Less): Changes in DFNWC
Less: Capital Expenditures
Debt-free Cash Flow Available for Distribution
Discounting Convention
Present Value Factor at 9.46% (Hubbard WACC Estimate)
Present Value - Debt-free Cash Flow

$ 15,130,275
12,094,588
$ 3,035,687

$ 60,148,170
47,807,568
$ 12,340,602

$ 61,717,248
48,814,609
$ 12,902,639

$ 63,583,124
50,085,617
$ 13,497,507

$ 64,836,918
50,878,419
$ 13,958,499

$ 65,914,632
51,604,731
$ 14,309,901

$ 66,925,554
52,296,211
$ 14,629,343

$ 67,845,259
52,951,281
$ 14,893,978

$ 68,726,445
53,575,822
$ 15,150,623

$ 69,550,586
54,157,882
$ 15,392,704

$ 1,311,664
320,097
575,284
$ 2,207,045
$
828,642
20,927
72,921
$
734,794
95,599
$
639,195
140,000
14,775
(115,000)
$
678,970
0.13
0.9884
$
671,113

$ 5,547,561
1,306,433
2,367,116
$ 9,221,110
$ 3,119,492
82,630
290,356
$ 2,746,506
340,756
$ 2,405,750
600,000
(9,742)
(600,000)
$ 2,396,008
0.76
0.9338
$ 2,237,438

$ 5,624,487
1,339,501
2,386,567
$ 9,350,555
$ 3,552,084
84,342
297,969
$ 3,169,773
386,588
$ 2,783,185
600,000
(28,608)
(600,000)
$ 2,754,577
1.76
0.8531
$ 2,349,969

$ 5,738,887
1,374,879
2,419,775
$ 9,533,541
$ 3,963,966
86,585
306,947
$ 3,570,434
480,545
$ 3,089,889
600,000
(29,738)
(600,000)
$ 3,060,151
2.76
0.7794
$ 2,385,034

$ 5,817,092
1,409,821
2,443,351
$ 9,670,264
$ 4,288,235
87,835
312,971
$ 3,887,429
535,156
$ 3,352,273
600,000
(35,132)
(600,000)
$ 3,317,141
3.76
0.7120
$ 2,361,893

$ 5,926,380
1,402,965
2,442,547
$ 9,771,892
$ 4,538,009
88,879
318,175
$ 4,130,955
584,784
$ 3,546,171
612,107
(13,274)
(612,103)
$ 3,532,901
4.76
0.6505
$ 2,298,118

$ 6,022,343
1,387,156
2,481,089
$ 9,890,588
$ 4,738,755
89,862
323,059
$ 4,325,834
625,828
$ 3,700,006
623,370
(15,167)
(623,363)
$ 3,684,846
5.76
0.5943
$ 2,189,802

$ 6,103,334
1,362,065
2,515,151
$ 9,980,550
$ 4,913,428
90,762
327,502
$ 4,495,164
660,071
$ 3,835,093
633,556
(12,168)
(633,546)
$ 3,822,935
6.76
0.5429
$ 2,075,520

$ 6,203,890
1,356,600
2,554,095
$ 10,114,585
$ 5,036,038
91,626
332,565
$ 4,611,847
681,799
$ 3,930,048
643,271
(10,879)
(643,260)
$ 3,919,180
7.76
0.4960
$ 1,943,881

$ 6,299,879
1,347,553
2,591,364
$ 10,238,796
$ 5,153,908
92,437
338,168
$ 4,723,303
703,048
$ 4,020,255
652,360
(4,101)
(652,349)
$ 4,016,165
8.76
0.4531
$ 1,819,829

[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]

Sum of Present Values - Detailed Periods
Add: Present Value - Terminal Year
Present Value of Operations
Add: Dell Trade Name
Add: Cornell Cash and Investments
Less: Cornell Total Debt
Total Equity Value
Shares Outstanding
Implied Equity Value Per Share

$ 20,332,598
21,308,747
$ 41,641,344
1,435,000
12,469,000
(6,311,000)
$ 49,234,344
1,782,660
$
27.62

Notes & Sources (on following page):

[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]

Normalized Debt-Free Cash Flow
EBITDA
Less: Depreciation (Normalized)
Adjusted EBIT
Income Tax Expense
Debt-Free Net Earnings
Add: Depreciation (Normalized)
Add/(Less): Changes in DFNWC
Less: Capital Expenditures
Debt-free Cash Flow Available for Distribution

Data
$ 5,375,663
(652,349)
$ 4,723,314
703,048
$ 4,020,266
652,349
(4,101)
(652,349)
$ 4,016,165

[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]

Constant Growth Model
Debt-free Cash Flow (Normalized)
Terminal Year Growth Rate
Debt-Free Cash Flow, Year Ahead
Divided by: Capitalization Rate
Capitalized Value at End of Estimation Period
Discount Period
Present Value Factor at 9.0% (Cornell WACC Estimate)
Present Value of Terminal Year

Data
$ 4,016,165
1.2%
$ 4,064,327
8.3%
$ 49,200,160
9.26
0.4331
$ 21,308,747

REVISED EXHIBIT 15B
Dell Inc.
E&Y ASC 805 Valuation Analysis
Consolidated Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
As of October 29, 2013
($ in millions, except Per Share Values)
Sources: Cash Flow Projections and Terminal Year Growth Rate [1] - [19], [41] -- Dell Inc ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022. Dell Trade Name Value [25] -- Dell Inc ASC
805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, DELLE00733762-4129 at 4117. WACC Estimate [20] per Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 132. Cash and Investments and Total Debt [26] -[27] per Expert
Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Revised Exhibit 11.
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